Method of identifying object using portion of random pattern identified via fiducial

ABSTRACT

A method of identifying an object having coded data identifying a plurality of fiducials on a surface of the object and a random pattern superimposed with the coded data. The random pattern defines a fingerprint for the object. The method includes the steps of: receiving, in a computer system, fingerprint data from a data reader interacting with the surface, the fingerprint data identifying some of the random pattern and a fiducial; using the fiducial to identify a portion of the random pattern; and identifying, using the identified portion of the random pattern, an object identity.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.11/488,163 filed Jul. 18, 2006, now issued with U.S. Pat. No. 7,874,494,all of which is herein incorporated by reference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention broadly relates to a method and apparatus for theidentification and protection of products and security documents usingmachine readable tags disposed on or in a surface of the product orsecurity document, and user interaction therewith.

CO-PENDING

The following applications have been filed by the applicant with thepresent application:

11/488,162 7,806,342 11/488,168 11/488,165 11/488,166

The disclosures of these co-pending applications are incorporated hereinby reference.

CROSS-REFERENCES

Various methods, systems and apparatus relating to the present inventionare disclosed in the following U.S. patents/patent applications filed bythe applicant or assignee of the present invention:

6,405,055 6,628,430 7,136,186 7,286,260 7,145,689 7,130,075 7,081,9747,177,055 7,209,257 7,161,715 7,154,632 7,158,258 7,148,993 7,075,6847,241,005 7,108,437 6,915,140 6,999,206 7,136,198 7,092,130 6,750,9016,476,863 6,788,336 7,249,108 6,566,858 6,331,946 6,246,970 6,442,5257,346,586 7,685,423 6,374,354 7,246,098 6,816,968 6,757,832 6,334,1906,745,331 7,249,109 7,197,642 7,093,139 7,509,292 7,685,424 7,743,2627,210,038 7,401,223 7,702,926 7,716,098 7,170,652 6,967,750 6,995,8767,099,051 7,453,586 7,193,734 7,773,245 7,095,533 6,914,686 7,161,7097,099,033 7,364,256 7,258,417 7,293,853 7,328,968 7,270,395 7,461,9167,510,264 7,334,864 7,255,419 7,284,819 7,229,148 7,258,416 7,273,2637,270,393 6,984,017 7,347,526 7,357,477 7,465,015 7,364,255 7,357,4767,758,148 7,284,820 7,341,328 7,246,875 7,322,669 7,445,311 7,452,0527,455,383 7,448,724 7,441,864 7,637,588 7,648,222 7,669,958 7,607,7557,699,433 7,658,463 7,506,958 7,472,981 7,448,722 7,575,297 7,438,3817,441,863 7,438,382 7,425,051 7,399,057 7,695,097 7,686,419 7,753,4727,448,720 7,448,723 7,445,310 7,399,054 7,425,049 7,367,648 7,370,9367,401,886 7,506,952 7,401,887 7,384,119 7,401,888 7,387,358 7,413,2817,530,663 7,467,846 7,669,957 7,771,028 7,758,174 7,695,123 7,798,6007,604,334 11/482,987 7,708,375 7,695,093 7,695,098 7,722,156 7,703,8827,510,261 7,722,153 7,243,835 10/815,630 7,703,693 10/815,638 7,251,05010/815,642 7,097,094 7,137,549 10/815,618 7,156,292 10/815,635 7,357,3237,654,454 7,137,566 7,131,596 7,128,265 7,207,485 7,197,374 7,175,0897,819,323 7,537,160 7,178,719 7,506,808 7,207,483 7,296,737 7,270,2667,605,940 7,128,270 7,784,681 7,677,445 7,506,168 7,441,712 7,663,78911/041,609 11/041,626 7,537,157 7,801,742 7,395,963 7,457,961 7,739,5097,467,300 7,467,299 7,565,542 7,457,007 7,150,398 7,159,777 7,450,2737,188,769 7,097,106 7,070,110 7,243,849 7,469,836 6,623,101 6,406,1296,505,916 6,457,809 6,550,895 6,457,812 7,152,962 6,428,133 7,204,9417,282,164 7,465,342 7,278,727 7,417,141 7,452,989 7,367,665 7,138,3917,153,956 7,423,145 7,456,277 7,550,585 7,122,076 7,148,345 7,470,3157,572,327 7,658,792 7,709,633 7,416,280 7,252,366 7,488,051 7,360,86511/124,158 11/124,196 11/124,199 11/124,162 11/124,202 7,735,99311/124,198 7,284,921 11/124,151 7,407,257 7,470,019 7,645,022 7,392,95011/124,149 7,360,880 7,517,046 7,236,271 11/124,174 7,753,517 11/124,1647,465,047 7,607,774 7,780,288 11/124,150 11/124,172 7,566,182 11/124,18411/124,182 7,715,036 11/124,171 11/124,181 7,697,159 7,595,904 7,726,7647,770,995 7,370,932 7,404,616 11/124,187 7,740,347 11/124,190 7,500,2687,558,962 7,447,908 7,792,298 7,661,813 7,456,994 7,431,449 7,466,44411/124,179 7,680,512 11/187,976 11/188,011 7,562,973 7,530,446 7,761,09011/228,500 7,668,540 7,738,862 7,805,162 11/228,531 11/228,504 7,738,91911/228,507 7,708,203 11/228,505 7,641,115 7,697,714 7,654,444 11/228,4847,499,765 11/228,518 7,756,526 11/228,496 7,558,563 11/228,50611/228,516 11/228,526 7,747,280 7,742,755 7,738,674 11/228,523 7,506,8027,724,399 11/228,527 7,403,797 11/228,520 7,646,503 11/228,511 7,672,66411/228,515 7,783,323 11/228,534 7,778,666 11/228,509 11/228,4927,558,599 11/228,510 11/228,508 11/228,512 11/228,514 11/228,4947,438,215 7,689,249 7,621,442 7,575,172 7,357,311 7,380,709 7,428,9867,403,796 7,407,092 11/228,513 7,637,424 7,469,829 7,774,025 7,558,5977,558,598 6,746,105 7,744,195 7,645,026 7,322,681 7,708,387 7,753,4967,712,884 7,510,267 7,465,041 11/246,712 7,465,032 7,401,890 7,401,9107,470,010 7,735,971 7,431,432 7,465,037 7,445,317 7,549,735 7,597,4257,661,800 7,712,869 7,156,508 7,159,972 7,083,271 7,165,834 7,080,8947,201,469 7,090,336 7,156,489 7,413,283 7,438,385 7,083,257 7,258,4227,255,423 7,219,980 7,591,533 7,416,274 7,367,649 7,118,192 7,618,1217,322,672 7,077,505 7,198,354 7,077,504 7,614,724 7,198,355 7,401,8947,322,676 7,152,959 7,213,906 7,178,901 7,222,938 7,108,353 7,104,6297,455,392 7,370,939 7,429,095 7,404,621 7,261,401 7,461,919 7,438,3887,328,972 7,303,930 7,401,405 7,464,466 7,464,465 7,246,886 7,128,4007,108,355 6,991,322 7,287,836 7,118,197 7,575,298 7,364,269 7,077,4936,962,402 7,686,429 7,147,308 7,524,034 7,118,198 7,168,790 7,172,2707,229,155 6,830,318 7,195,342 7,175,261 7,465,035 7,108,356 7,118,2027,510,269 7,134,744 7,510,270 7,134,743 7,182,439 7,210,768 7,465,0367,134,745 7,156,484 7,118,201 7,111,926 7,431,433 7,018,021 7,401,9017,468,139 7,128,402 7,387,369 7,484,832 7,448,729 7,246,876 7,431,4317,419,249 7,377,623 7,328,978 7,334,876 7,147,306 7,654,645 7,784,9157,466,440 7,249,901 7,477,987 7,503,493 7,156,289 7,178,718 7,225,9797,540,429 7,584,402 11/084,806 7,721,948 7,079,712 6,825,945 7,330,9746,813,039 7,190,474 6,987,506 6,824,044 7,038,797 6,980,318 6,816,2747,102,772 7,350,236 6,681,045 6,678,499 6,679,420 6,963,845 6,976,2206,728,000 7,110,126 7,173,722 6,976,035 6,813,558 6,766,942 6,965,4546,995,859 7,088,459 6,720,985 7,286,113 6,922,779 6,978,019 6,847,8837,131,058 7,295,839 7,406,445 7,533,031 6,959,298 6,973,450 7,150,4046,965,882 7,233,924 7,707,082 7,593,899 7,175,079 7,162,259 6,718,0617,464,880 7,012,710 6,825,956 7,451,115 7,222,098 7,590,561 7,263,5087,031,010 6,972,864 6,862,105 7,009,738 6,989,911 6,982,807 7,518,7566,829,387 6,714,678 6,644,545 6,609,653 6,651,879 10/291,555 7,293,2407,467,185 7,415,668 7,044,363 7,004,390 6,867,880 7,034,953 6,987,5817,216,224 7,506,153 7,162,269 7,162,222 7,290,210 7,293,233 7,293,2346,850,931 6,865,570 6,847,961 10/685,583 7,162,442 10/685,584 7,159,7847,557,944 7,404,144 6,889,896 7,174,056 6,996,274 7,162,088 7,388,9857,417,759 7,362,463 7,259,884 7,167,270 7,388,685 6,986,459 10/954,1707,181,448 7,590,622 7,657,510 7,324,989 7,231,293 7,174,329 7,369,2617,295,922 7,200,591 7,693,828 11/020,260 11/020,321 11/020,319 7,466,4367,347,357 11/051,032 7,382,482 7,602,515 7,446,893 11/082,815 7,389,4237,401,227 6,991,153 6,991,154 7,589,854 7,551,305 7,322,524 7,408,6707,466,439 11/206,778 7,571,193 11/222,977 7,327,485 7,428,070 7,225,4027,797,528 11/442,428 7,068,382 7,007,851 6,957,921 6,457,883 7,044,38111/203,205 7,094,910 7,091,344 7,122,685 7,038,066 7,099,019 7,062,6516,789,194 6,789,191 7,529,936 7,278,018 7,360,089 7,526,647 7,467,4166,644,642 6,502,614 6,622,999 6,669,385 6,827,116 7,011,128 7,416,0096,549,935 6,987,573 6,727,996 6,591,884 6,439,706 6,760,119 7,295,3327,064,851 6,826,547 6,290,349 6,428,155 6,785,016 6,831,682 6,741,8716,927,871 6,980,306 6,965,439 6,840,606 7,036,918 6,977,746 6,970,2647,068,389 7,093,991 7,190,491 7,511,847 7,663,780 10/962,412 7,177,0547,364,282 10/965,733 10/965,933 7,728,872 7,468,809 7,180,609 7,538,7937,466,438 7,292,363 7,515,292 7,414,741 7,202,959 6,982,798 6,870,9666,822,639 6,474,888 6,627,870 6,724,374 6,788,982 7,263,270 6,788,2936,946,672 6,737,591 7,091,960 7,369,265 6,792,165 7,105,753 6,795,5936,980,704 6,768,821 7,132,612 7,041,916 6,797,895 7,015,901 7,289,8827,148,644 10/778,056 10/778,058 7,515,186 7,567,279 10/778,062 7,096,1997,286,887 7,400,937 7,474,930 7,324,859 7,218,978 7,245,294 7,277,0857,187,370 7,609,410 7,660,490 10/919,379 7,019,319 7,593,604 7,660,4897,043,096 7,148,499 7,463,250 7,590,311 11/155,557 11/193,481 7,567,24111/193,482 11/193,479 7,336,267 7,388,221 7,577,317 7,055,739 7,233,3206,830,196 6,832,717 7,182,247 7,120,853 7,082,562 6,843,420 7,793,8526,789,731 7,057,608 6,766,944 6,766,945 7,289,103 7,412,651 7,299,9697,264,173 7,108,192 7,549,595 7,111,791 7,077,333 6,983,878 7,564,6057,134,598 7,431,219 6,929,186 6,994,264 7,017,826 7,014,123 7,134,6017,150,396 7,469,830 7,017,823 7,025,276 7,284,701 7,080,780 7,376,8847,334,739 10/492,169 7,469,062 7,359,551 7,444,021 7,308,148 7,630,96210/531,229 7,630,553 7,630,554 10/510,391 7,660,466 7,526,128 6,957,7687,456,820 7,170,499 7,106,888 7,123,239 6,982,701 6,982,703 7,227,5276,786,397 6,947,027 6,975,299 7,139,431 7,048,178 7,118,025 6,839,0537,015,900 7,010,147 7,133,557 6,914,593 7,437,671 6,938,826 7,278,5667,123,245 6,992,662 7,190,346 7,417,629 7,468,724 7,382,354 7,715,0357,221,781 11/102,843 7,263,225 7,287,688 10/727,162 7,377,608 7,399,0437,121,639 7,165,824 7,152,942 7,818,519 7,181,572 7,096,137 7,302,5927,278,034 7,188,282 7,592,829 10/727,179 10/727,192 7,770,008 7,707,6217,523,111 7,573,301 7,660,998 7,783,886 10/754,938 10/727,160 7,171,3237,278,697 7,360,131 7,369,270 6,795,215 7,070,098 7,154,638 6,805,4196,859,289 6,977,751 6,398,332 6,394,573 6,622,923 6,747,760 6,921,1447,092,112 7,192,106 7,457,001 7,173,739 6,986,560 7,008,033 7,551,3247,222,780 7,270,391 7,525,677 7,571,906 7,195,328 7,182,422 7,374,2667,427,117 7,448,707 7,281,330 7,328,956 7,735,944 7,188,928 7,093,9897,377,609 7,600,843 10/854,498 7,390,071 7,549,715 7,252,353 7,607,7577,267,417 10/854,505 7,517,036 7,275,805 7,314,261 7,281,777 7,290,8527,484,831 7,758,143 10/854,527 7,549,718 10/854,520 7,631,190 7,557,9417,757,086 10/854,501 7,266,661 7,243,193 10/854,518 7,163,345 7,465,0337,452,055 7,470,002 7,722,161 7,475,963 7,448,735 7,465,042 7,448,7397,438,399 11/293,794 7,467,853 7,461,922 7,465,020 7,722,185 7,461,9107,270,494 7,632,032 7,475,961 7,547,088 7,611,239 7,735,955 7,758,0387,681,876 7,780,161 7,703,903 7,448,734 7,425,050 7,364,263 7,201,4687,360,868 7,234,802 7,303,255 7,287,846 7,156,511 10/760,264 7,258,4327,097,291 7,645,025 10/760,248 7,083,273 7,367,647 7,374,355 7,441,8807,547,092 10/760,206 7,513,598 10/760,270 7,198,352 7,364,264 7,303,2517,201,470 7,121,655 7,293,861 7,232,208 7,328,985 7,344,232 7,083,2727,261,400 7,461,914 7,431,441 7,621,620 7,669,961 7,331,663 7,360,8617,328,973 7,427,121 7,407,262 7,303,252 7,249,822 7,537,309 7,311,3827,360,860 7,364,257 7,390,075 7,350,896 7,429,096 7,384,135 7,331,6607,416,287 7,488,052 7,322,684 7,322,685 7,311,381 7,270,405 7,303,2687,470,007 7,399,072 7,393,076 7,681,967 7,588,301 7,249,833 7,524,0167,490,927 7,331,661 7,524,043 7,300,140 7,357,492 7,357,493 7,566,1067,380,902 7,284,816 7,284,845 7,255,430 7,390,080 7,328,984 7,350,9137,322,671 7,380,910 7,431,424 7,470,006 7,585,054 7,347,534 7,441,8657,469,989 7,367,650 7,469,990 7,441,882 7,556,364 11/293,812 7,357,4967,467,863 7,431,440 7,431,443 7,527,353 7,524,023 7,513,603 7,467,8527,465,045 6,454,482 6,808,330 6,527,365 6,474,773 6,550,997 7,093,9236,957,923 7,131,724 7,396,177 7,168,867 7,125,098 7,413,363 7,188,9307,079,292

The above applications have been identified by their filing docketnumber, which will be substituted with the corresponding applicationnumber, once assigned.

BACKGROUND

Surface Coding Background

The netpage surface coding consists of a dense planar tiling of tags.Each tag encodes its own location in the plane. Each tag also encodes,in conjunction with adjacent tags, an identifier of the regioncontaining the tag. This region ID is unique among all regions. In thenetpage system the region typically corresponds to the entire extent ofthe tagged surface, such as one side of a sheet of paper.

The surface coding is designed so that an acquisition field of viewlarge enough to guarantee acquisition of an entire tag is large enoughto guarantee acquisition of the ID of the region containing the tag.Acquisition of the tag itself guarantees acquisition of the tag'stwo-dimensional position within the region, as well as othertag-specific data. The surface coding therefore allows a sensing deviceto acquire a region ID and a tag position during a purely localinteraction with a coded surface, e.g. during a “click” or tap on acoded surface with a pen.

The use of netpage surface coding is described in more detail in thefollowing copending patent applications, U.S. Ser. No. 10/815,647,entitled “Obtaining Product Assistance” filed on 2 Apr. 2004; and U.S.Ser. No. 10/815,609, entitled “Laser Scanner Device for Printed ProductIdentification Cod” filed on 2 Apr. 2004.

Cryptography Background

Cryptography is used to protect sensitive information, both in storageand in transit, and to authenticate parties to a transaction. There aretwo classes of cryptography in widespread use: secret-key cryptographyand public-key cryptography.

Secret-key cryptography, also referred to as symmetric cryptography,uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt a message. Two parties wishingto exchange messages must first arrange to securely exchange the secretkey.

Public-key cryptography, also referred to as asymmetric cryptography,uses two encryption keys. The two keys are mathematically related insuch a way that any message encrypted using one key can only bedecrypted using the other key. One of these keys is then published,while the other is kept private. They are referred to as the public andprivate key respectively. The public key is used to encrypt any messageintended for the holder of the private key. Once encrypted using thepublic key, a message can only be decrypted using the private key. Thustwo parties can securely exchange messages without first having toexchange a secret key. To ensure that the private key is secure, it isnormal for the holder of the private key to generate the public-privatekey pair.

Public-key cryptography can be used to create a digital signature. Ifthe holder of the private key creates a known hash of a message and thenencrypts the hash using the private key, then anyone can verify that theencrypted hash constitutes the “signature” of the holder of the privatekey with respect to that particular message, simply by decrypting theencrypted hash using the public key and verifying the hash against themessage. If the signature is appended to the message, then the recipientof the message can verify both that the message is genuine and that ithas not been altered in transit.

Secret-key can also be used to create a digital signature, but has thedisadvantage that signature verification can also be performed by aparty privy to the secret key.

To make public-key cryptography work, there has to be a way todistribute public keys which prevents impersonation. This is normallydone using certificates and certificate authorities. A certificateauthority is a trusted third party which authenticates the associationbetween a public key and a person's or other entity's identity. Thecertificate authority verifies the identity by examining identitydocuments etc., and then creates and signs a digital certificatecontaining the identity details and public key. Anyone who trusts thecertificate authority can use the public key in the certificate with ahigh degree of certainty that it is genuine. They just have to verifythat the certificate has indeed been signed by the certificateauthority, whose public key is well-known.

To achieve comparable security to secret-key cryptography, public-keycryptography utilises key lengths an order of magnitude larger, i.e. afew thousand bits compared with a few hundred bits.

Schneier B. (Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons1996) provides a detailed discussion of cryptographic techniques.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In a first aspect the present invention provides an object comprisingfirst coded data disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first codeddata identifying a plurality of locations on the surface and a layout ofat least one interactive element associated with the surface.

In a further aspect the object further comprises graphical informationprinted on the surface, said graphical information relating to the atleast one interactive element.

Optionally the layout is identified by a layout number, and one layoutnumber is associated with a plurality of objects.

In a further aspect there is provided an object which is a consumerproduct item.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a class of product.

Optionally, the class of product is identified by a product class numberand/or a manufacturer number.

Optionally, the class of product is identified by a Universal ProductCode (UPC).

Optionally, the surface is defined by a label, packaging or the productitem itself.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a flag fordistinguishing the first coded data from other types of coded data.

In a further aspect there is provided an object further comprising aunique identifier for uniquely identifying the object, said uniqueidentifier being distinguishable from the first coded data andindependently readable.

Optionally, the unique identifier identifies a serial number.

Optionally, the unique identifier identifies an Electronic Product Code(EPC).

Optionally, the unique identifier comprises second coded data disposedon or in a surface of the object, said second coded data identifying aunique identity for the object.

Optionally, the second coded data further identifies a digital signaturefor the unique identity.

Optionally, the first coded data identifies a flag for distinguishingthe first coded data from the second coded data.

Optionally, the unique identifier comprises a random pattern disposed onor in a surface of the object, said random pattern defining at least onefingerprint for the object.

Optionally, the random pattern is defined by a taggant randomlydispersed in ink printed on the surface.

Optionally, the unique identifier is contained in an RFID tag.

Optionally, the first coded data is defined by a plurality of tags, eachtag identifying its own location on the surface and the layout of the atleast one interactive element associated with the surface.

Optionally, each tag further identifies a class of product and/or a flagfor distinguishing the first coded data from other types of coded data.

In another aspect the present invention provides data reader forinteracting with an object, said object comprising first coded datadisposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded data identifying aplurality of locations on the surface and a layout of at least oneinteractive element associated with the surface,

said data reader comprising:

-   -   an optical sensor for sensing at least some of the first coded        data;    -   a processor for generating layout data using the sensed coded        data, said layout data identifying a position of the data reader        relative to the surface and a layout of the at least one        interactive element; and    -   means for communicating the layout data to a computer system.

In another aspect the present invention provides data reader forinteracting with an object, said object comprising coded data disposedon or in a surface thereof, said coded data identifying: a plurality oflocations on the surface and either (i) a layout of at least oneinteractive element associated with the surface, or (ii) a uniqueidentity of the object,

said data reader comprising:

-   -   an optical sensor for sensing at least some of the coded data;    -   a processor configured for:        -   determining whether the sensed coded data identifies (i) the            layout or (ii) the unique identity;        -   generating layout data using the sensed coded data, said            layout data identifying a position of the data reader            relative to the surface and either (i) the layout of the at            least one interactive element or (ii) the unique identity;            and    -   means for communicating the layout data to a computer system.

Optionally the processor determines whether the sensed coded dataidentifies (i) the layout or (ii) the unique identity, based on thepresence of a flag in the sensed coded data.

In a further aspect there is provided a data reader which is selectedfrom any one of the group comprising: a fixed scanner; a handheldscanner; a mobile phone; a pen; a stylus; and a personal digitalassistant.

In another aspect the present invention provides a system forinteracting with an object, said system comprising:

-   -   an object comprising first coded data disposed on or in a        surface thereof, said first coded data identifying: a plurality        of locations on the surface and a layout of at least one        interactive element associated with the surface; and    -   a data reader comprising:        -   an optical sensor for sensing at least some of the first            coded data;        -   a processor for generating layout data using the sensed            coded data, said layout data identifying a position of the            data reader relative to the surface and a layout of the at            least one interactive element; and        -   means for communicating the layout data to a computer            system.

In another aspect the present invention provides a system foridentifying an interaction with an object, said object comprising firstcoded data disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded dataidentifying: a plurality of locations on the surface and a layout of atleast one interactive element associated with the surface,

said system comprising a computer system configured for:

-   -   receiving layout data from a data reader interacting with the        surface, said layout data identifying a position of the data        reader relative to the surface and a layout of the at least one        interactive element;    -   identifying in the computer system, using the layout data, an        interaction with the object.

Optionally, the computer system is configured for:

-   -   retrieving the layout identified by the first coded data using        the layout data; and    -   identifying the interaction by interpreting the position of the        reader with reference to a zone of the at least one interactive        element as specified in the retrieved layout.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method of interactingwith an object, said object comprising first coded data disposed on orin a surface thereof, said first coded data identifying: a plurality oflocations on the surface and a layout of at least one interactiveelement associated with the surface,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   sensing at least some of the first coded data;    -   generating layout data using the sensed coded data, said layout        data identifying a position of the data reader relative to the        surface and a layout of the at least one interactive element;        and    -   communicating the layout data to a computer system.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method of identifyingan interaction with an object, said object comprising first coded datadisposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded data identifying:a plurality of locations on the surface and a layout of at least oneinteractive element associated with the surface,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   receiving, in a computer system, layout data from a data reader        interacting with the surface, said layout data identifying a        position of the data reader relative to the surface and a layout        of the at least one interactive element;    -   identifying in the computer system, using the layout data, an        interaction with the object.

Optionally, said identifying step comprises:

-   -   retrieving the layout identified by the first coded data using        the layout data; and    -   identifying the interaction by interpreting the position of the        reader with reference to a zone of the at least one interactive        element as specified in the retrieved layout.

In a second aspect the present invention provides an object comprisingfirst coded data disposed on or in a surface thereof and an identifier,said first coded data identifying a plurality of locations on thesurface and said identifier identifying a unique identity of the object,wherein the first coded data and the identifier are distinguishable fromeach other and independently readable.

Optionally, the identifier identifies a serial number.

Optionally, the identifier identifies an Electronic Product Code (EPC).

Optionally, the identifier further identifies a digital signature forthe unique identity.

Optionally, the identifier comprises second data disposed on or in asurface of the object.

Optionally, the first and second coded data are disposed on the samesurface of the object.

Optionally, the second coded data comprises a barcode.

Optionally, the barcode is a linear barcode or a two-dimensionalbarcode.

Optionally, the first coded data is printed with a first ink and thesecond coded data is printed with a second ink, wherein the first andsecond inks may be the same or different from each other.

Optionally, the first ink is substantially invisible to the unaidedhuman eye and the second ink is visible to the unaided human eye.

Optionally, at least a portion of the first coded data is coincidentwith the second coded data.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a flag fordistinguishing the first coded data from the second coded data.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a layout of at leastone interactive element associated with the surface.

Optionally, the layout is identified by a layout number, and one layoutnumber is associated with a plurality of objects.

Optionally, the object is a consumer product item and the first codeddata further identifies a product class.

Optionally, the product class is identified by a product class numberand/or a manufacturer number.

Optionally, the product class is identified by a Universal Product Code(UPC).

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies the unique identityof the object.

Optionally, the identifier comprises an RFID tag.

Optionally, the identifier comprises a random pattern disposed on or ina surface of the object, said random pattern defining at least onefingerprint for the object.

Optionally, the random pattern is defined by a taggant randomlydispersed in ink printed on the surface.

In a third aspect the present invention provides an object comprisingfirst coded data disposed on or in a surface thereof and an RFID tag,said first coded data identifying a plurality of locations on thesurface and said RFID tag identifying a unique identity of the object.

Optionally, the RFID tag identifies a serial number.

Optionally, the RFID tag identifies an Electronic Product Code (EPC).

Optionally, the RFID tag further identifies a digital signature for theunique identity.

Optionally, the digital signature is a public key signature.

Optionally, the digital signature is a random signature.

Optionally, the digital signature is a secret-key digital signature.

Optionally, the RFID tag is disposed on a same or different surface ofthe object relative to the coded data.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a layout of at leastone interactive element associated with the surface.

Optionally, the RFID tag further identifies a layout of at least oneinteractive element associated with the surface.

Optionally, the layout is identified by a layout number, and one layoutnumber is associated with a plurality of objects.

Optionally, the object is a consumer product item and the first codeddata further identifies a product class.

Optionally, the product class is identified by a product class numberand/or a manufacturer number.

Optionally, the product class is identified by a Universal Product Code(UPC).

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies the unique identityof the object.

In a further aspect there is provided a data reader for interacting withan object, said object comprising first coded data disposed on or in asurface thereof and an RFID tag, said first coded data identifying aplurality of locations on the surface and said RFID tag identifying aunique identity of the object,

said data reader comprising:

-   -   an optical sensor for sensing at least some of the first coded        data;    -   an RFID transceiver for sensing the RFID tag;    -   a processor for generating indicating data using the sensed        coded data and the sensed RFID tag, said indicating data        identifying a position of the data reader relative to the        surface and a unique identity of the object; and    -   means for communicating the indicating data to a computer        system.

In another aspect there is provided a data reader which is selected fromany one of the group comprising: a fixed scanner; a handheld scanner; amobile phone; a pen; a stylus; and a personal digital assistant.

In another aspect the present invention provides a system forinteracting with an object, said system comprising:

-   -   an object comprising first coded data disposed on or in a        surface thereof and an RFID tag, said first coded data        identifying a plurality of locations on the surface and said        RFID tag identifying a unique identity of the object; and    -   a data reader comprising:        -   an optical sensor for sensing at least some of the first            coded data;        -   an RFID transceiver for sensing the RFID tag;        -   a processor for generating indicating data using the sensed            coded data and the sensed RFID tag, said indicating data            identifying a position of the data reader relative to the            surface and a unique identity of the object; and        -   means for communicating the indicating data to a computer            system.

In a further aspect the present invention provides a method ofinteracting with an object, said object comprising first coded datadisposed on or in a surface thereof and an RFID tag, said first codeddata identifying a plurality of locations on the surface and said RFIDtag identifying a unique identity of the object,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   sensing at least some of the first coded data;    -   sensing the RFID tag;    -   generating indicating data using the sensed coded data and        sensed RFID tag, said indicating data identifying a position of        the data reader relative to the surface and a unique identity of        the object; and    -   communicating the indicating data to a computer system.

In a fourth aspect the present invention provides an object comprisingfirst coded data and a random pattern disposed on or in a surfacethereof, said first coded data identifying a plurality of fiducials onthe surface and said random pattern defining at least one fingerprintfor the object.

Optionally, the or each fingerprint identifies an object identity.

Optionally, the or each fingerprint identifies a serial number.

Optionally, the or each fingerprint identifies an Electronic ProductCode (EPC).

Optionally, the random pattern is defined by a taggant randomlydispersed in ink printed on the surface.

Optionally, the fiducials are all distinct from each other.

Optionally, each fiducial identifies a unique location on the surface.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a layout of at leastone interactive element associated with the surface.

Optionally, the layout is identified by a layout number, and one layoutnumber is associated with a plurality of objects.

Optionally, the object is a consumer product item and the first codeddata further identifies a product class.

Optionally, the product class is identified by a product class numberand/or a manufacturer number.

Optionally, the product class is identified by a Universal Product Code(UPC).

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a unique identity ofthe object.

In a further aspect the present invention provides a data reader forinteracting with an object, said object comprising first coded data anda random pattern disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first codeddata identifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface and said randompattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object,

said data reader comprising:

-   -   a first optical sensor for sensing at least some of the first        coded data;    -   a second optical sensor for sensing at least some of the random        pattern;    -   a processor configured for generating fingerprint data using the        sensed coded data and the sensed random pattern, said        fingerprint data identifying at least some of the random pattern        and at least one fiducial; and    -   communication means configured for communicating the fingerprint        data to a computer system.

Optionally, the first and second optical sensors are the same opticalsensor or different optical sensors.

In another aspect the present invention provides a data reader which isselected from any one of the group comprising: a fixed scanner; ahandheld scanner; a mobile phone; a pen; a stylus; and a personaldigital assistant.

In another aspect the present invention provides a system forinteracting with an object, said system comprising:

-   -   an object comprising first coded data and a random pattern        disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded data        identifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface and said        random pattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object;        and    -   a data reader comprising:        -   a first optical sensor for sensing at least some of the            first coded data;        -   a second optical sensor for sensing at least some of the            random pattern;        -   a processor configured for generating fingerprint data using            the sensed coded data and the sensed random pattern, said            fingerprint data identifying at least some of the random            pattern and at least one fiducial; and        -   communication means configured for communicating the            fingerprint data to a computer system.

In another aspect the present invention provides a system foridentifying an object, said object comprising first coded data and arandom pattern disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first codeddata identifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface and said randompattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object,

said system comprising a computer system configured for:

-   -   receiving fingerprint data from a data reader interacting with        the surface, said fingerprint data identifying at least some of        the random pattern and at least one fiducial; and    -   identifying in the computer system, using the fingerprint data,        an object identity.

In another aspect the present invention provides a system forauthenticating an object, said object comprising first coded data and arandom pattern disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first codeddata identifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface and said randompattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object,

said system comprising a computer system configured for:

-   -   receiving fingerprint data from a data reader interacting with        the surface, said fingerprint data identifying at least some of        the random pattern and at least one fiducial;    -   identifying, using the fingerprint data, an object identity; and    -   authenticating the object using the object identity.

Optionally, the computer system is configured for:

-   -   identifying a reference fingerprint using the fingerprint data;        and    -   retrieving an object identity corresponding to the reference        fingerprint identified.

Optionally, the reference fingerprint comprises a plurality of randommarks positioned relative to at least one fiducial.

Optionally, the first coded data further identifies a product class, andthe computer system is configured for:

-   -   receiving indicating data from the data reader, said indicating        data identifying the product class;    -   identifying, using the fingerprint data and the indicating data,        the object identity.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method of recordingat least one reference fingerprint for an object, said object having aunique object identity and comprising first coded data and a randompattern disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded dataidentifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   sensing and recording the first coded data and the random        pattern;    -   determining at least one reference fingerprint for the object,        the or each reference fingerprint comprising at least a portion        of the recorded random pattern and at least one fiducial        corresponding to said portion;    -   associating the object identity with the or each reference        fingerprint.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method of interactingwith an object, said object comprising first coded data and a randompattern disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded dataidentifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface and said randompattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   sensing at least some of the first coded data;    -   sensing at least some of the random pattern;    -   generating fingerprint data using the sensed coded data and the        sensed random pattern, said fingerprint data identifying at        least some of the random pattern and at least one fiducial; and    -   communicating the fingerprint data to a computer system.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method of identifyingan object, said object comprising first coded data and a random patterndisposed on or in a surface thereof, said first coded data identifying aplurality of fiducials on the surface and said random pattern definingat least one fingerprint for the object,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   receiving, in a computer system, fingerprint data from a data        reader interacting with the surface, said fingerprint data        identifying at least some of the random pattern and at least one        fiducial; and    -   identifying in the computer system, using the fingerprint data,        an object identity.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method ofauthenticating an object, said object comprising first coded data and arandom pattern disposed on or in a surface thereof, said first codeddata identifying a plurality of fiducials on the surface and said randompattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   receiving, in a computer system, fingerprint data from a data        reader interacting with the surface, said fingerprint data        identifying at least some of the random pattern and at least one        fiducial;    -   identifying in the computer system, using the fingerprint data,        an object identity; and    -   authenticating the object using the object identity.

In a fifth aspect the present invention provides a method ofauthenticating an object comprising an identifier, said methodcomprising the steps of:

-   -   reading the identifier using a data reader to generate identity        data;    -   sending an authentication request from the data reader to a        computer system, said request comprising the identity data;    -   receiving, in the data reader, an authentication message from        the computer system, said authentication message comprising an        indication of authenticity, a description of an object        associated with the identity data and a digital signature of the        authentication message;    -   verifying the digital signature; and    -   conveying the description of the object to a user if the        signature is valid.

Optionally, the identifier comprises or is contained in any one of:coded data disposed in or on a surface of the object; an RFID tag; alinear barcode; a 2D barcode.

Optionally, the identifier comprises one of a plurality of tags disposedon or in a surface of the object, each tag containing coded dataidentifying the object identity.

Optionally, each tag identifies its own location on the surface.

Optionally, the digital signature is a public-key signature.

Optionally, the public-key signature was generated using a private keyassociated with the manufacturer of the object.

Optionally, the signature is verified using a public key associated withthe private key.

Optionally, the data reader obtains the public key from a certificate.

Optionally, the certificate is associated with the manufacturer or acertificate authority.

Optionally, the authentication message identifies the manufacturer.

Optionally, the data reader verifies the certificate.

Optionally, the certificate includes a description of the manufacturer.

Optionally, the data reader conveys the description of the manufacturerto the user.

Optionally, the description of the object comprises at least one of:

-   -   an identity of the object;    -   a name or description of a manufacturer of the object;    -   a manufacturing date/time of the object;    -   a selling date/time of the object;    -   a sold status of the object;    -   a purchased status of the object; and    -   a pedigree of the object.

Optionally, the description of the object is conveyed to the uservisually on a display or audibly.

Optionally, the authentication request comprises a nonce generated bythe data reader.

Optionally, the authentication message comprises the nonce.

In another aspect the present invention provides a method ofauthenticating an object comprising an identifier, said methodcomprising the steps of:

-   -   receiving, in a computer system, an authentication request from        a data reader, said request comprising identity data generated        by reading the identifier;    -   sending, to the data reader, an authentication message from the        computer system, said authentication message comprising an        indication of authenticity, a description of an object        associated with the identity data and a digital signature of the        authentication message,        thereby allowing the data reader to verify the digital signature        and convey the description of the object to a user if the        signature is valid.

In another aspect the present invention provides a data reader forauthenticating an object comprising an identifier, said data readerbeing configured for:

-   -   reading the identifier to generate identity data;    -   sending an authentication request from the data reader to a        computer system, said request comprising the identity data;    -   receiving an authentication message from the computer system,        said authentication message comprising an indication of        authenticity, a description of an object associated with the        identity data and a digital signature of the authentication        message;    -   verifying the digital signature; and    -   conveying the description of the object to a user if the        signature is valid.

In another aspect the present invention provides a data reader which isa mobile phone.

In another aspect the present application provides a system forauthenticating an object, said system comprising an object comprising anidentifier and a data reader configured for:

-   -   reading the identifier to generate identity data;    -   sending an authentication request from the data reader to a        computer system, said request comprising the identity data;    -   receiving an authentication message from the computer system,        said authentication message comprising an indication of        authenticity, a description of an object associated with the        identity data and a digital signature of the authentication        message;    -   verifying the digital signature; and    -   conveying the description of the object to a user if the        signature is valid.

In another aspect the present application provides a system forauthenticating an object comprising an identifier, said systemcomprising a computer system configured for:

-   -   receiving an authentication request from a data reader, said        request comprising identity data generated by reading the        identifier;    -   sending, to the data reader, an authentication message, said        authentication message comprising an indication of authenticity,        a description of an object associated with the identity data and        a digital signature of the authentication message,        thereby allowing the data reader to verify the digital signature        and convey the description of the object to a user if the        signature is valid.

In a sixth aspect the present invention provides an object comprising:

-   -   a first identifier identifying a unique object identity;    -   a second identifier identifying a first digital signature for        the identity; and    -   a mask for masking at least one of the first identifier and the        second identifier,        wherein the at least one masked identifier is readable only when        said mask has been removed.

Optionally, only the first identifier is masked.

Optionally, only the second identifier is masked.

Optionally, both the first and second identifiers are masked.

Optionally, removal of said mask provides a visual indication oftampering to a user.

Optionally, the mask is a scratch-off layer.

Optionally, the object is packaged, the mask being provided by packagingfor the object.

Optionally, the at least one masked identifier comprises coded datadisposed on or in a surface of the object.

Optionally, the coded data is contained in a linear barcode, a 2Dbarcode or a plurality of printed tags.

Optionally, the mask is opaque.

Optionally, the coded data is disposed on an inside surface of packagingfor the object.

Optionally, the at least one masked identifier comprises an RFID tag.

Optionally, the mask is radiopaque.

Optionally, the first digital signature is selected from any one of: apublic-key digital signature; a secret-key digital signature; and arandom number.

In a further aspect the object further comprises a third identifier foruse in supply chain events.

Optionally, said third identifier identifies a second digital signaturefor the identity.

Optionally, the first and second digital signatures are different.

Optionally, said third identifier further identifies the unique identityof the object.

Optionally, the first identifier identifies an Electronic Product Code(EPC).

In a further aspect the present invention provides a method ofregistering a scan event for an object with a computer system, saidobject comprising a first identifier identifying a unique objectidentity, a second identifier identifying a first digital signature forthe identity and a mask for masking at least one of the first identifierand the second identifier,

said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   removing the mask;    -   reading the first and second identifiers;    -   generating registration data identifying the object identity and        the first digital signature; and    -   sending the registration data to the computer system.

Optionally, the scan event is used to register the object as purchased.

Optionally, the registration data further identifies a purchaseridentity.

Optionally, purchaser identity data is contained in a data reader usedto read the identifier.

In a further aspect the present invention provides a method ofauthenticating an object comprising an identifier and a mask for theidentifier, said method comprising the steps of:

-   -   removing the mask;    -   reading the identifier using a data reader to generate identity        data;    -   sending an authentication request from the data reader to a        computer system, said request comprising the identity data;    -   receiving, in the data reader, an authentication message from        the computer system, said authentication message comprising an        indication of authenticity; and    -   conveying the indicated authenticity to a user.

Optionally, the authentication message comprises a description of anobject associated with the identity data and a digital signature, saidmethod comprising the further steps of:

-   -   verifying the digital signature; and    -   conveying the description of the object to a user if the        signature is valid.

In a seventh aspect the present invention provides a method oftransacting objects, each object comprising an identifier identifying anobject identity,

said method comprising, in a computer system, the steps of:

-   -   receiving transaction data from a data reader, said transaction        data identifying the object identity;    -   identifying a transaction history for the object identity;    -   determining whether the object identity has been transacted in a        previous transaction; and either:    -   (i) allowing the transaction and updating the transaction        history in the event that the object identity has not been        previously transacted, or    -   (ii) sending transaction history data to the data reader in the        event that the object identity has been previously transacted.

Optionally, the transaction history data identifies at least oneprevious transaction of the object identity.

Optionally, the transaction history data enables a user to conclude thatthe object is second-hand or the identifier is a duplicate.

Optionally, the transaction history data identifies when the previoustransaction was made.

Optionally, the transaction history data identifies where the previoustransaction was made.

Optionally, the transaction history data identifies a data reader usedfor recording the previous transaction.

Optionally, the transaction history data identifies a user to whomownership of the object identity is recorded.

Optionally, recordal of ownership is allowable only once in thetransaction history for each object identity.

Optionally, recordal of ownership is allowable only after an initialpurchasing transaction in the transaction history.

Optionally, the object comprises an interactive element specifically forrecording ownership.

Optionally, the interactive element is masked by a tamper-proofmechanism.

Optionally, the transaction data identifies a user identity, said useridentity being contained in the data reader.

Optionally, the transaction history records ownership of the objectidentity with the user identity, in the event that the object identityhas not been previously transacted.

Optionally, the identifier comprises or is contained in any one of:coded data disposed in or on a surface of the object; an RFID tag; alinear barcode; a 2D barcode.

Optionally, the identifier comprises one of a plurality of tags disposedon or in a surface of the object, each tag containing coded dataidentifying the object identity.

Optionally, each tag identifies its own location on the surface.

Optionally, the identifier identifies a serial number and/or anElectronic Product Code (EPC).

Optionally, the identifier further identifies a digital signature forthe object identity, and the transaction data identifies the digitalsignature.

In a further aspect there is provided a system for transacting objects,each object comprising an identifier identifying an object identity,

said system comprising a computer system configured for:

-   -   receiving transaction data from a data reader, said transaction        data identifying the object identity;    -   identifying a transaction history for the object identity;    -   determining whether the object identity has been transacted in a        previous transaction; and either:    -   (i) allowing the transaction and updating the transaction        history in the event that the object identity has not been        previously transacted, or    -   (ii) sending transaction history data to the data reader in the        event that the object identity has been previously transacted.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

An example of the present invention will now be described with referenceto the accompanying drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is an example of a document including Hyperlabel encoding;

FIG. 2 is an example of a system for interacting with the Hyperlabeldocument of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is a further example of system for interacting with theHyperlabel document of FIG. 1;

FIG. 4. is a first example of a tag structure;

FIG. 5. is an example of a symbol unit cell for the tag structure ofFIG. 4;

FIG. 6. is an example of an array of the symbol unit cells of FIG. 5;

FIG. 7. is an example of symbol bit ordering in the unit cells of FIG.5;

FIG. 8. is an example of the tag structure of FIG. 4 with every bit set;

FIG. 9. is an example of tag types within a tag group for the tagstructure of FIG. 4;

FIG. 10. is an example of continuous tiling of the tag groups of FIG. 9;

FIG. 11 is an example of interleaved codewords for the tag structure ofFIG. 4;

FIG. 12 is an example of a code word for the tag structure of FIG. 4;

FIG. 13. is an example of a tag and its eight immediate neighbours, eachlabelled with its corresponding bit index in the active area map;

FIG. 14. is an alternative example of tag types within a tag group forthe tag structure of FIG. 4;

FIG. 15. is an example of continuous tiling of the tag groups of FIG.14;

FIG. 16. is an example of the orientation-indicating cyclic positioncodeword R for the tag group of FIG. 14;

FIG. 17. is an example of a local codeword A for the tag group of FIG.14;

FIG. 18. is an example of distributed codewords B, C, D and E, for thetag group of FIG. 14;

FIG. 19. is an example of a layout of complete tag group;

FIG. 20. is an example of a code word for the tag group of FIG. 14;

FIG. 21. is a second example of a tag structure;

FIG. 22. is an example of a symbol unit cell for the tag structure ofFIG. 21;

FIG. 23. is an example of an array of the symbol unit cells of FIG. 22;

FIG. 24. is an example of symbol bit ordering in the unit cells of FIG.22;

FIG. 25. is an example of the tag structure of FIG. 21 with every bitset;

FIG. 26. is an example of tag types within a tag group for the tagstructure of FIG. 21;

FIG. 27. is an example of continuous tiling of the tag groups of FIG.26;

FIG. 28 is an example of an orientation indicating cyclic positioncodeword for the tag structure of FIG. 21;

FIG. 29 is an example of a codeword for the tag structure of FIG. 21;

FIG. 30 is an example of fragments of distributed codewords for the tagstructure of FIG. 21;

FIG. 31. is an example of continuous tiling of the tag groups of FIG.21;

FIG. 32. is an example of a tag segment of the tag groups of FIG. 21;

FIG. 33. is an example of inter-segment spacing for the tag groups ofFIG. 21;

FIG. 34. is an example of the effect of inter-segment spacing on targetposition for the tag groups of FIG. 21;

FIG. 35. is an example of a code word for the tag group of FIG. 21;

FIG. 36. is an example of tag coordinates for the tag group of FIG. 21;

FIG. 37. is an example of tag and six immediate neighbour tags eachlabelled with its corresponding bit index in the active area map;

FIG. 38. is an example of a contiguous set of tags making up a datablock;

FIG. 39. is an example of an expanded tag structure;

FIG. 40 is an example of a codeword for the tag structure of FIG. 39;

FIG. 41 is an example of fragments of distributed codewords for the tagstructure of FIG. 39;

FIG. 42 is a second example of fragments of distributed codewords forthe tag structure of FIG. 39;

FIG. 43 is an example of an item signature object model;

FIG. 44. is an example of Scanning at Retailer interactions;

FIG. 45. is an example of Online Scanning interaction detail;

FIG. 46. is an example of Offline Scanning interaction details;

FIG. 47. is an example of netpage Pen Scanning interactions;

FIG. 48. is an example of netpage Pen Scanning interaction details;

FIG. 49. is an example of a Hyperlabel tag class diagram;

FIG. 50. is an example of an item ID class diagram;

FIG. 51. is an example of a note ID class diagram

FIG. 52. is an example of a pharmaceutical ID class diagram;

FIG. 53. is an example of an Object Description, ownership andaggregation class diagram;

FIG. 54. is an example of an Object Scanning History class diagram;

FIG. 55. is an example of scanner class diagram;

FIG. 56. is an example of an object ID hot list diagram;

FIG. 57. is an example of a valid ID range class diagram;

FIG. 58. is an example of Public Key List class diagram;

FIG. 59. is an example of a Trusted Authenticator class diagram;

FIG. 60. is an example of Tagging and Tracking Object Management;

FIG. 61. is an example of a layout ID class diagram;

FIG. 62. is an alternative example of Hyperlabel tag class diagram;

FIG. 63. is an example of a basic product item authenticationinteraction diagram;

FIG. 64. is an example of a more secure product item authenticationinteraction diagram;

FIG. 65. is an example of mobile phone displaying a product itemauthentication message; and

FIG. 66. is an example of a secure scan event interaction diagram.

FIG. 67 shows a consumer product item with Hyperlabel tags and an RFIDtag;

FIG. 68 shows a consumer product item with Hyperlabel tags and aseparate barcode identifier;

FIG. 69 shows a consumer product item with Hyperlabel tags and graphicdata containing a randomly distributed taggant overprinted on theHyperlabel tags; and

FIG. 70 shows a consumer product item with an object identifier code anda digital signature code having a mask layer partially scratched off.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SPECIFIC EMBODIMENTS

The netpage surface coding consists of a dense planar tiling of tags.Each tag encodes its own location in the plane. Each tag also encodes,in conjunction with adjacent tags, an identifier of the regioncontaining the tag. In the netpage system, the region typicallycorresponds to the entire extent of the tagged surface, such as one sideof a sheet of paper.

Hyperlabel is the adaptation of the netpage tags for use in unique itemidentification for a wide variety of applications, including securitydocument protection, object tracking, pharmaceutical security,supermarket automation, interactive product labels, web-browsing fromprinted surfaces, paper based email, and many others.

Using Memjet™ digital printing technology (which is the subject of anumber of pending U.S. patent applications including U.S. Ser. No.10/407,212), Hyperlabel tags are printed over substantially an entiresurface, such as a security document, bank note, or pharmaceuticalpackaging, using infrared (IR) ink. By printing the tags ininfrared-absorptive ink on any substrate which is infra-red-reflective,the near-infrared wavelengths, and hence the tags are invisible to thehuman eye but are easily sensed by a solid-state image sensor with anappropriate filter. This allows machine readable information to beencoded over a large portion of the note or other surface, with novisible effect on the original note text or graphics thereon. A scanninglaser or image sensor can read the tags on any part of the surface toperforms associated actions, such as validating each individual note oritem.

An example of such a Hyperlabel encoded document, is shown in FIG. 1. Inthis example, the Hyperlabel document consists of graphic data 2 printedusing visible ink, and coded data 3 formed from Hyperlabel tags 4. Thedocument includes an interactive element 6 defined by a zone 7 whichcorresponds to the spatial extent of a corresponding graphic 8. In use,the tags encode tag data including an ID. By sensing at least one tag,and determining and interpreting the encoded ID using an appropriatesystem, this allows the associated actions to be performed.

In one example, a tag map is used to define a layout of the tags on theHyperlabel document based on the ID encoded within the tag data. The IDcan also be used to reference a document description which describes theindividual elements of the Hyperlabel document, and in particulardescribes the type and spatial extent (zone) of interactive elements,such as a button or text field. Thus, in this example, the element 6 hasa zone 7 which corresponds to the spatial extent of a correspondinggraphic 8. This allows a computer system to interpret interactions withthe Hyperlabel document.

In position indicating techniques, the ID encoded within the tag data ofeach tag allows the exact position of the tag on the Hyperlabel documentto be determined from the tag map. The position can then be used todetermine whether the sensed tag is positioned in a zone of aninteractive element from the document description.

In object indicating techniques, the ID encoded within the tag dataallows the presence of the tag in a region of the document to bedetermined from the tag map (the relative position of the tag within theregion may also be indicated). In this case, the document descriptioncan be used to determine whether the region corresponds to the zone ofan interactive element.

An example of this process will now be described with reference to FIGS.2 and 3 which show how a sensing device in the form of a Netpage pen orHyperlabel reader 101, which interacts with the coded data on a printedHyperlabel document 1, such as a security document, label, productpackaging or the like. An product item 200 carrying a Hyperlabel tags isalso shown in FIG. 2.

The Hyperlabel reader 101 senses a tag using an area image sensor anddetects tag data. The Hyperlabel reader 101 uses the sensed data tag togenerate interaction data which is transmitted via a short-range radiolink 9 to a relay 44, which may form part of a computer 75 or a printer601. The relay sends the interaction data, via a network 19, to adocument server 10, which uses the ID to access the documentdescription, and interpret the interaction. In appropriatecircumstances, the document server sends a corresponding message to anapplication server 13, which can then perform a corresponding action.

In an alternative embodiment, the PC, Web terminal, netpage printer orrelay device may communicate directly with local or remote applicationsoftware, including a local or remote Web server. Relatedly, output isnot limited to being printed by the netpage printer. It can also bedisplayed on the PC or Web terminal, and further interaction can bescreen-based rather than paper-based, or a mixture of the two.

Typically Netpage pen users register with a registration server 11,which associates the user with an identifier stored in the respectiveNetpage pen. By providing the sensing device identifier as part of theinteraction data, this allows users to be identified, allowingtransactions or the like to be performed.

Hyperlabel documents are generated by having an ID server generate an IDwhich is transferred to the document server 10. The document server 10determines a document description and then records an associationbetween the document description and the ID, to allow subsequentretrieval of the document description using the ID.

The ID is then used to generate the tag data, as will be described inmore detail below, before the document is printed by the Hyperlabelprinter 601, using the page description and the tag map.

Each tag is represented by a pattern which contains two kinds ofelements. The first kind of element is a target. Targets allow a tag tobe located in an image of a coded surface, and allow the perspectivedistortion of the tag to be inferred. The second kind of element is amacrodot. Each macrodot encodes the value of a bit by its presence orabsence.

The pattern is represented on the coded surface in such a way as toallow it to be acquired by an optical imaging system, and in particularby an optical system with a narrowband response in the near-infrared.The pattern is typically printed onto the surface using a narrowbandnear-infrared ink.

In the Hyperlabel system the region typically corresponds to the surfaceof an entire product item, or to a security document, and the region IDcorresponds to the unique item ID. For clarity in the followingdiscussion we refer to items and item IDs (or simply IDs), with theunderstanding that the item ID corresponds to the region ID.

The surface coding is designed so that an acquisition field of viewlarge enough to guarantee acquisition of an entire tag is large enoughto guarantee acquisition of the ID of the region containing the tag.Acquisition of the tag itself guarantees acquisition of the tag'stwo-dimensional position within the region, as well as othertag-specific data. The surface coding therefore allows a sensing deviceto acquire a region ID and a tag position during a purely localinteraction with a coded surface, e.g. during a “click” or tap on acoded surface with a pen.

A wide range of different tag structures can be used, and some exampleswill now be described.

FIRST EXAMPLE TAG STRUCTURE

FIG. 4 shows the structure of a complete tag. Each of the four blackcircles is a target. The tag, and the overall pattern, has four-foldrotational symmetry at the physical level.

Each square region represents a symbol, and each symbol represents fourbits of information.

FIG. 5 shows the structure of a symbol. It contains four macrodots, eachof which represents the value of one bit by its presence (one) orabsence (zero).

The macrodot spacing is specified by the parameter s throughout thisdocument. It has a nominal value of 143 μm, based on 9 dots printed at apitch of 1600 dots per inch. However, it is allowed to vary by ±10%according to the capabilities of the device used to produce the pattern.

FIG. 6 shows an array of nine adjacent symbols. The macrodot spacing isuniform both within and between symbols.

FIG. 7 shows the ordering of the bits within a symbol. Bit zero is theleast significant within a symbol; bit three is the most significant.Note that this ordering is relative to the orientation of the symbol.The orientation of a particular symbol within the tag is indicated bythe orientation of the label of the symbol in the tag diagrams. Ingeneral, the orientation of all symbols within a particular segment ofthe tag have the same orientation, consistent with the bottom of thesymbol being closest to the centre of the tag.

Only the macrodots are part of the representation of a symbol in thepattern. The square outline of a symbol is used in this document to moreclearly elucidate the structure of a tag. FIG. 8, by way ofillustration, shows the actual pattern of a tag with every bit set. Notethat, in practice, every bit of a tag can never be set.

A macrodot is nominally circular with a nominal diameter of (5/9)s.However, it is allowed to vary in size by ±10% according to thecapabilities of the device used to produce the pattern.

A target is nominally circular with a nominal diameter of (17/9)s.However, it is allowed to vary in size by ±10% according to thecapabilities of the device used to produce the pattern.

The tag pattern is allowed to vary in scale by up to ±10% according tothe capabilities of the device used to produce the pattern. Anydeviation from the nominal scale is recorded in the tag data to allowaccurate generation of position samples.

Each symbol shown in the tag structure in FIG. 4 has a unique label.Each label consists an alphabetic prefix and a numeric suffix.

Tag Group

Tags are arranged into tag groups. Each tag group contains four tagsarranged in a square. Each tag therefore has one of four possible tagtypes according to its location within the tag group square. The tagtypes are labelled 00, 10, 01 and 11, as shown in FIG. 9.

FIG. 10 shows how tag groups are repeated in a continuous tiling oftags. The tiling guarantees the any set of four adjacent tags containsone tag of each type.

Codewords

The tag contains four complete codewords. Each codeword is of apunctured 2⁴-ary (8,5) Reed-Solomon code.

Two of the codewords are unique to the tag. These are referred to aslocal and are labelled A and B. The tag therefore encodes up to 40 bitsof information unique to the tag.

The remaining two codewords are unique to a tag type, but common to alltags of the same type within a contiguous tiling of tags. These arereferred to as global and are labelled C and D, subscripted by tag type.A tag group therefore encodes up to 160 bits of information common toall tag groups within a contiguous tiling of tags.

The layout of the four codewords is shown in FIG. 11.

Reed-Solomon Encoding

Codewords are encoded using a punctured 2⁴-ary (8,5) Reed-Solomon code.

A 2⁴-ary (8,5) Reed-Solomon code encodes 20 data bits (i.e. five 4-bitsymbols) and 12 redundancy bits (i.e. three 4-bit symbols) in eachcodeword. Its error-detecting capacity is three symbols. Itserror-correcting capacity is one symbol.

As shown in FIG. 12, codeword coordinates are indexed in coefficientorder, and the data bit ordering follows the codeword bit ordering.

A punctured 2⁴-ary (8,5) Reed-Solomon code is a 2⁴-ary (15,5)Reed-Solomon code with seven redundancy coordinates removed. The removedcoordinates are the most significant redundancy coordinates.

The code has the following primitive polynominal:p(x)=x ⁴ +x+1

The code has the following generator polynominal:g(x)=(x+α)(x+α ²) . . . (x+α ¹⁰)

For a detailed description of Reed-Solomon codes, refer to Wicker, S. B.and V. K. Bhargava, eds., Reed-Solomon Codes and Their Applications,IEEE Press, 1994.

Tag Coordinate Space

The tag coordinate space has two orthogonal axes labelled x and yrespectively. When the positive x axis points to the right then thepositive y axis points down.

The surface coding does not specify the location of the tag coordinatespace origin on a particular tagged surface, nor the orientation of thetag coordinate space with respect to the surface. This information isapplication-specific. For example, if the tagged surface is a sheet ofpaper, then the application which prints the tags onto the paper mayrecord the actual offset and orientation, and these can be used tonormalise any digital ink subsequently captured in conjunction with thesurface.

The position encoded in a tag is defined in units of tags. Byconvention, the position is taken to be the position of the centre ofthe target closest to the origin.

Tag Information Content

Table 1 defines the information fields embedded in the surface coding.Table 2 defines how these fields map to codewords.

TABLE 1 Field definitions Field width description per codeword codewordtype 2 The type of the codeword, i.e. one of A (b′00′), B (b′01′), C(b′10′) and D (b′11′). per tag tag type 2 The type of the tag, i.e. oneof 00 (b′00′), 01 (b′01′), 10 (b′10′) and 11 (b′11′) - corresponds tothe bottom two bits of the x and y coordinates of the tag. x coordinate13 The unsigned x coordinate of the tag allows a maximum coordinatevalue of approximately 14 m. y coordinate 13 The unsigned y coordinateof the tag^(b). active area flag 1 A flag indicating whether the tag isa member of an active area. b′1′ indicates membership. active area map 1A flag indicating whether an active area map is flag present. b′1′indicates the presence of a map (see next field). If the map is absentthen the value of each map entry is derived from the active area flag(see previous field). active area map 8 A map¹of which of the tag'simmediate eight neighbours are members of an active area. b′1′ indicatesmembership (FIG. 13 indicates the bit ordering of the map) data fragment8 A fragment of an embedded data stream. Only present if the active areamap is absent. per tag group encoding 8 The format of the encoding.format 0: the present encoding Other values are TBA. Region flags 8Flags controlling the interpretation and routing of region-relatedinformation. 0: region ID is an EPC 1: region is linked 2: region isinteractive 3: region is signed 4: region includes data 5: regionrelates to mobile application Other bits are reserved and must be zero.tag size 16 The difference between the actual tag size and adjustmentthe nominal tag size (1.7145 mm (based on 1600 dpi, 9 dots per macrodot,and 12 macrodots per tag)), in 10 nm units, in sign-magnitude format.Region ID 96 The ID of the region containing the tags. CRC 16 A CRC oftag group data (CCITT CRC-16 (ITU, Interface between Data TerminalEquipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE) forterminals operating in the packet mode and connected to public datanetworks by dedicated circuit, ITU-T X.25 (10/96)) Total 320

The active area map indicates whether the corresponding tags are membersof an active area. An active area is an area within which any capturedinput should be immediately forwarded to the corresponding Hyperlabelserver for interpretation. It also allows the Hyperlabel sensing deviceto signal to the user that the input will have an immediate effect.

TABLE 2 Mapping of fields to codewords codeword field codeword bitsfield Width bits A 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′00′) 10:2  x coordinate 912:4  19:11 Y coordinate 9 12:4  B 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′01′)  2tag type 1 0 5:2 x coordinate 4 3:0  6 tag type 1 1 9:6 y coordinate 43:0 10 active area flag 1 all 11 active area map flag 1 all 19:12 activearea map 8 all 19:12 data fragment 8 all C₀₀ 1:0 codeword type 2 all(b′10′) 9:2 encoding format 8 all 17:10 region flags 8 all 19:18 tagsize adjustment 2 1:0 C₀₁ 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′10′) 15:2  tag sizeadjustment 14 15:2  19:16 region ID 4 3:0 C₁₀ 1:0 codeword type 2 all(b′10′) 19:2  region ID 18 21:4  C₁₁ 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′10′)19:2  region ID 18 39:22 D₀₀ 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′11′) 19:2 region ID 18 57:40 D₀₁ 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′11′) 19:2  region ID18 75:58 D₁₀ 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′11′) 19:2  region ID 18 93:76D₁₁ 1:0 codeword type 2 all (b′11′) 3:2 region ID 2 95:94 19:4  CRC 16all Note that the tag type can be moved into a global codeword tomaximise local codeword utilization.This in turn can allow largercoordinates and/or 16-bit data fragments (potentially configurably inconjunction with coordinate precision). However, this reduces theindependence of position decoding from region ID decoding and has notbeen included in the specification at this time.Embedded Data

If the “region includes data” flag in the region flags is set then thesurface coding contains embedded data. The data is encoded in multiplecontiguous tags' data fragments, and is replicated in the surface codingas many times as it will fit.

The embedded data is encoded in such a way that a random and partialscan of the surface coding containing the embedded data can besufficient to retrieve the entire data. The scanning system reassemblesthe data from retrieved fragments, and reports to the user whensufficient fragments have been retrieved without error.

As shown in Table 3, a 200-bit data block encodes 160 bits of data. Theblock data is encoded in the data fragments of A contiguous group of 25tags arranged in a 5×5 square. A tag belongs to a block whose integercoordinate is the tag's coordinate divided by 5. Within each block thedata is arranged into tags with increasing x coordinate withinincreasing y coordinate.

A data fragment may be missing from a block where an active area map ispresent. However, the missing data fragment is likely to be recoverablefrom another copy of the block.

Data of arbitrary size is encoded into a superblock consisting of acontiguous set of blocks arranged in a rectangle. The size of thesuperblock is encoded in each block. A block belongs to a superblockwhose integer coordinate is the block's coordinate divided by thesuperblock size. Within each superblock the data is arranged into blockswith increasing x coordinate within increasing y coordinate.

The superblock is replicated in the surface coding as many times as itwill fit, including partially along the edges of the surface coding.

The data encoded in the superblock may include more precise typeinformation, more precise size information, and more extensive errordetection and/or correction data.

TABLE 3 Embedded data block field width description data type 8 The typeof the data in the superblock. Values include: 0: type is controlled byregion flags 1: MIME Other values are TBA. superblock width 8 The widthof the superblock, in blocks. superblock height 8 The height of thesuperblock, in blocks. data 160 The block data. CRC 16 A CRC of theblock data. total 200

ALTERNATIVE FIRST EXAMPLE TAG STRUCTURE

Tag Group

Tags are arranged into tag groups. Each tag group contains four tagsarranged in a square. Each tag therefore has one of four possible tagtypes according to its location within the tag group square. The tagtypes are labelled 00, 10, 01 and 11, as shown in FIG. 14.

Each tag in the tag group is rotated as shown in the figure, i.e. tagtype 00 is rotated 0 degrees, tag type 10 is rotated 90 degrees, tagtype 11 is rotated 180 degrees, and tag type 01 is rotated 270 degrees.

FIG. 15 shows how tag groups are repeated in a continuous tiling oftags. The tiling guarantees the any set of four adjacent tags containsone tag of each type.

Orientation-Indicating Cyclic Position Code

The tag contains a 2⁴-ary (4, 1) cyclic position codeword which can bedecoded at any of the four possible orientations of the tag to determinethe actual orientation of the tag. Symbols which are part of the cyclicposition codeword have a prefix of “R” and are numbered 0 to 3 in orderof increasing significance.

The cyclic position codeword is (0, 7, 9, E₁₆) Note that it only usesfour distinct symbol values, even though a four-bit symbol has sixteenpossible values. During decoding, any unused symbol value should, ifdetected, be treated as an erasure. To maximise the probability oflow-weight bit error patterns causing erasures rather than symbolerrors, the symbol values are chosen to be as evenly spaced on thehypercube as possible.

The minimum distance of the cyclic position code is 4, hence itserror-correcting capacity is one symbol in the presence of up to oneerasure, and no symbols in the presence of two or more erasures.

The layout of the orientation-indicating cyclic position codeword isshown in FIG. 16.

Local Codeword

The tag locally contains one complete codeword which is used to encodeinformation unique to the tag. The codeword is of a punctured 2⁴-ary(13, 7) Reed-Solomon code. The tag therefore encodes up to 28 bits ofinformation unique to the tag.

The layout of the local codeword is shown in FIG. 17.

Distributed Codewords

The tag also contains fragments of four codewords which are distributedacross the four adjacent tags in a tag group and which are used toencode information common to a set of contiguous tags. Each codeword isof a 2⁴-ary (15,11) Reed-Solomon code. Any four adjacent tags thereforetogether encode up to 176 bits of information common to a set ofcontiguous tags.

The layout of the four complete codewords, distributed across the fouradjacent tags in a tag group, is shown in FIG. 18. The order of the fourtags in the tag group in FIG. 18 is the order of the four tags in FIG.14.

FIG. 19 shows the layout of a complete tag group.

Reed-Solomon Encoding—Local Codeword

The local codeword is encoded using a punctured 2⁴-ary (13, 7)Reed-Solomon code. The code encodes 28 data bits (i.e. seven symbols)and 24 redundancy bits (i.e. six symbols) in each codeword. Itserror-detecting capacity is six symbols. Its error-correcting capacityis three symbols.

As shown in FIG. 20, codeword coordinates are indexed in coefficientorder, and the data bit ordering follows the codeword bit ordering.

The code is a 2⁴-ary (15, 7) Reed-Solomon code with two redundancycoordinates removed. The removed coordinates are the most significantredundancy coordinates.

The code has the following primitive polynominal:p(x)=x ⁴ +x+1  (EQ 1)

The Code has the Following Generator Polynominal:g(x)=(x+α)(x+α ²) . . . (x+α ⁸)  (EQ 2)Reed-Solomon Encoding—Distributed Codewords

The distributed codewords are encoded using a 2⁴-ary (15, 11)Reed-Solomon code. The code encodes 44 data bits (i.e. eleven symbols)and 16 redundancy bits (i.e. four symbols) in each codeword. Itserror-detecting capacity is four symbols. Its error-correcting capacityis two symbols.

Codeword coordinates are indexed in coefficient order, and the data bitordering follows the codeword bit ordering.

The code has the same primitive polynominal as the local codeword code.

The code has the following generator polynominal:g(x)=(x+α)(x+α ²) . . . (x+α ⁴)  (EQ 3)Tag Coordinate Space

The tag coordinate space has two orthogonal axes labelled x and yrespectively. When the positive x axis points to the right then thepositive y axis points down.

The surface coding does not specify the location of the tag coordinatespace origin on a particular tagged surface, nor the orientation of thetag coordinate space with respect to the surface. This information isapplication-specific. For example, if the tagged surface is a sheet ofpaper, then the application which prints the tags onto the paper mayrecord the actual offset and orientation, and these can be used tonormalise any digital ink subsequently captured in conjunction with thesurface.

The position encoded in a tag is defined in units of tags. Byconvention, the position is taken to be the position of the centre ofthe target closest to the origin.

Tag Information Content

Field Definitions

Table 4 defines the information fields embedded in the surface coding.Table 5 defines how these fields map to codewords.

TABLE 4 Field definitions width field (bits) description per tag xcoordinate 9 or 13 The unsigned x coordinate of the tag allows maximumcoordinate values of approximately 0.9 m and 14 m respectively. ycoordinate 9 or 13 The unsigned y coordinate of the tag allows maximumcoordinate values of approximately 0.9 m and 14 m respectively activearea flag 1 A flag indicating whether the area (the diameter of thearea, centered on the tag, is nominally 5 times the diagonal size of thetag) immediately surrounding the tag intersects an active area. b′1′indicates intersection. data fragment flag 1 A flag indicating whether adata fragment is present (see next field). b′1′ indicates the presenceof a data fragment. If the data fragment is present then the width ofthe x and y coordinate fields is 9. If it is absent then the width is13. data fragment 0 or 8  A fragment of an embedded data stream. per taggroup (i.e. per region) encoding format 8 The format of the encoding. 0:the present encoding Other values are reserved. region flags 8 Flagscontrolling the interpretation of region data. 0: region ID is an EPC 1:region has signature 2: region has embedded data 3: embedded data issignature Other bits are reserved and must be zero. tag size ID 8 The IDof the tag size. 0: the present tag size the nominal tag size is 1.7145mm, based on 1600 dpi, 9 dots per macrodot, and 12 macrodots per tagOther values are reserved. region ID 96  The ID of the region containingthe tags. signature 36  The signature of the region. high-order 4 Thewidth of the high-order part of the x and coordinate width y coordinatesof the tag. (w) high-order x 0 to 15 High-order part of the x coordinateof the coordinate tag expands the maximum coordinate values toapproximately 2.4 km and 38 km respectively high-order y 0 to 15High-order part of the y coordinate of the coordinate tag expands themaximum coordinate values to approximately 2.4 km and 38 kmrespectively. CRC 16  A CRC of tag group data.

An active area is an area within which any captured input should beimmediately forwarded to the corresponding Hyperlabel server forinterpretation. This also allows the Hyperlabel server to signal to theuser that the input has had an immediate effect. Since the server hasaccess to precise region definitions, any active area indication in thesurface coding can be imprecise so long as it is inclusive.

The width of the high-order coordinate fields, if non-zero, reduces thewidth of the signature field by a corresponding number of bits. Fullcoordinates are computed by prepending each high-order coordinate fieldto its corresponding coordinate field.

TABLE 5 Mapping of fields to codewords codeword field codeword bitsfield width bits A 12:0  x coordinate 13 all 12:9  data fragment 4 3:025:13 y coordinate 13 all 25:22 data fragment 4 7:4 26 active area flag1 all 27 data fragment flag 1 all B 7:0 encoding format 8 all 15:8 region flags 8 all 23:16 tag size ID 8 all 39:24 CRC 16 all 43:40high-order 4 3:0 coordinate width (w) C 35:0  signature 36 all (35 −w):(36 − high-order x w all 2w) coordinate 35:(36 − w) high-order y wall coordinate 43:36 region ID 8 7:0 D 43:0  region ID 44 51:8  E 43:0 region ID 44 95:52Embedded Data

If the “region has embedded data” flag in the region flags is set thenthe surface coding contains embedded data. The data is encoded inmultiple contiguous tags' data fragments, and is replicated in thesurface coding as many times as it will fit.

The embedded data is encoded in such a way that a random and partialscan of the surface coding containing the embedded data can besufficient to retrieve the entire data. The scanning system reassemblesthe data from retrieved fragments, and reports to the user whensufficient fragments have been retrieved without error.

As shown in Table 6, a 200-bit data block encodes 160 bits of data. Theblock data is encoded in the data fragments of a contiguous group of 25tags arranged in a 5×5 square. A tag belongs to a block whose integercoordinate is the tag's coordinate divided by 5. Within each block thedata is arranged into tags with increasing x coordinate withinincreasing y coordinate.

A data fragment may be missing from a block where an active area map ispresent. However, the missing data fragment is likely to be recoverablefrom another copy of the block.

Data of arbitrary size is encoded into a superblock consisting of acontiguous set of blocks arranged in a rectangle. The size of thesuperblock is encoded in each block. A block belongs to a superblockwhose integer coordinate is the block's coordinate divided by thesuperblock size. Within each superblock the data is arranged into blockswith increasing x coordinate within increasing y coordinate.

The superblock is replicated in the surface coding as many times as itwill fit, including partially along the edges of the surface coding.

The data encoded in the superblock may include more precise typeinformation, more precise size information, and more extensive errordetection and/or correction data.

TABLE 6 Embedded data block field width description data type 8 The typeof the data in the superblock. Values include: 0: type is controlled byregion flags 1: MIME Other values are TBA. superblock width 8 The widthof the superblock, in blocks. superblock height 8 The height of thesuperblock, in blocks. data 160 The block data. CRC 16 A CRC of theblock data. total 200

It will be appreciated that any form of embedded data may be used,including for example, text, image, audio, video data, such as productinformation, application data, contact data, business card data, anddirectory data.

Region Signatures

If the “region has signature” flag in the region flags is set then thesignature field contains a signature with a maximum width of 36 bits.The signature is typically a random number associated with the region IDin a secure database. The signature is ideally generated using a trulyrandom process, such as a quantum process, or by distilling randomnessfrom random events.

In an online environment the signature can be validated, in conjunctionwith the region ID, by querying a server with access to the securedatabase.

If the “region has embedded data” and “embedded data is signature” flagsin the region flags are set then the surface coding contains a 160-bitcryptographic signature of the region ID. The signature is encoded in aone-block superblock.

In an online environment any number of signature fragments can be used,in conjunction with the region ID and optionally the random signature,to validate the signature by querying a server with knowledge of thefull signature or the corresponding private key.

In an offline (or online) environment the entire signature can berecovered by reading multiple tags, and can then be validated using thecorresponding public signature key.

Signature verification is discussed in more detail below.

SECOND EXAMPLE TAG STRUCTURE

FIG. 21 shows the structure of a complete tag. Each of the six blackcircles is a target. The tag, and the overall pattern, has six-foldrotational symmetry at the physical level.

Each diamond-shaped region represents a symbol, and each symbolrepresents four bits of information.

FIG. 22 shows the structure of a symbol. It contains four macrodots,each of which represents the value of one bit by its presence (one) orabsence (zero).

The macrodot spacing is specified by the parameter s throughout thisdocument. It has a nominal value of 143 μm, based on 9 dots printed at apitch of 1600 dots per inch. However, it is allowed to vary by ±10%according to the capabilities of the device used to produce the pattern.

FIG. 23 shows an array of five adjacent symbols. The macrodot spacing isuniform both within and between symbols.

FIG. 24 shows the ordering of the bits within a symbol. Bit zero is theleast significant within a symbol; bit three is the most significant.Note that this ordering is relative to the orientation of the symbol.The orientation of a particular symbol within the tag is indicated bythe orientation of the label of the symbol in the tag diagrams. Ingeneral, the orientation of all symbols within a particular segment ofthe tag have the same orientation, consistent with the bottom of thesymbol being closest to the centre of the tag.

Only the macrodots are part of the representation of a symbol in thepattern. The diamond-shaped outline of a symbol is used in this documentto more clearly elucidate the structure of a tag. FIG. 25, by way ofillustration, shows the actual pattern of a tag with every bit set. Notethat, in practice, every bit of a tag can never be set.

A macrodot is nominally circular with a nominal diameter of (5/9)s.However, it is allowed to vary in size by ±10% according to thecapabilities of the device used to produce the pattern.

A target is nominally circular with a nominal diameter of (17/9)s.However, it is allowed to vary in size by ±10% according to thecapabilities of the device used to produce the pattern.

The tag pattern is allowed to vary in scale by up to ±10% according tothe capabilities of the device used to produce the pattern. Anydeviation from the nominal scale is recorded in the tag data to allowaccurate generation of position samples.

Each symbol shown in the tag structure in FIG. 21 has a unique label.Each label consists an alphabetic prefix and a numeric suffix.

Tag Group

Tags are arranged into tag groups. Each tag group contains three tagsarranged in a line. Each tag therefore has one of three possible tagtypes according to its location within the tag group. The tag types arelabelled P, Q and R, as shown in FIG. 26.

FIG. 27 shows how tag groups are repeated in a continuous tiling oftags. The tiling guarantees the any set of three adjacent tags containsone tag of each type.

Orientation-Indicating Cyclic Position Code

The tag contains a 2³-ary (6,1) cyclic position codeword (this work iscurrently the subject of two pending U.S. patent applications, entitled“Cyclic position codes” and “Orientation indicating cyclic positioncodes” with application Ser. Nos. 10/120,441 and 10/409,864,respectively) which can be decoded at any of the six possibleorientations of the tag to determine the actual orientation of the tag.Symbols which are part of the cyclic position codeword have a prefix of“R” and are numbered 0 to 5 in order of increasing significance.

The layout of the orientation-indicating cyclic position codeword isshown in FIG. 28.

The cyclic position codeword is (0,5,6,9,A₁₆,F₁₆). Note that it onlyuses six distinct symbol values, even though a four-bit symbol hassixteen possible values. During decoding, any unused symbol valueshould, if detected, be treated as an erasure. To maximise theprobability of low-weight bit error patterns causing erasures ratherthan symbol errors, the symbol values are chosen to be evenly-spaced onthe hypercube.

The minimum distance of the cyclic position code is 6, hence itserror-correcting capacity is two symbols in the presence of up to oneerasure, one symbol in the presence of two or three erasures, and nosymbols in the presence of four or more erasures.

Local Codeword

The tag locally contains one complete codeword, labelled A, which isused to encode information unique to the tag. The codeword is of apunctured 2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code. The tag therefore encodes upto 28 bits of information unique to the tag.

The layout of the local codeword is shown in FIG. 29.

Distributed Codewords

The tag also contains fragments of six codewords, labelled B through G,which are distributed across three adjacent tags and which are used toencode information common to a set of contiguous tags. Each codeword isof a punctured 2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code. Any three adjacent tagstherefore together encode up to 168 bits of information common to a setof contiguous tags.

The layout of the first four fragments of the six codewords B through Gin tag type P is shown in FIG. 30. The layout in the other tag typesfollows the layout in tag type P, with symbols 4 through 7 in tag typeQ, and fragments 8 through 11 in tag type Q.

The layout of the six complete codewords B through G, distributed acrossthe three tag types P, Q and R, is shown in FIG. 31.

As shown earlier in FIG. 27, the tiling guarantees the any set of threeadjacent tags contains one tag of each type, and therefore contains acomplete set of distributed codewords. The tag type, used to determinethe registration of the distributed codewords with respect to aparticular set of adjacent tags, is inferred from the x-y coordinateencoded in the local codeword of each tag.

Tag Segment Geometry

FIG. 32 shows the geometry of a tag segment.

FIG. 33 shows the spacing d between tag segments, required to maintainconsistent spacing between macrodots, where d is given by:d=(1−√{square root over (3)}/2)s

FIG. 34 shows the effect of the inter-segment spacing d on targetposition. Compared with their nominal positions in relation toclosely-packed segments (i.e. with d=0), diagonal targets must bedisplaced by(Δ_(x),Δ_(y))=(±1/√{square root over (3)},±1)d,and horizontal targets must be displaced by(Δ_(x),Δ_(y))=(±2/√{square root over (3)},0)d.Reed-Solomon Encoding

Codewords are encoded using a punctured 2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code.

A 2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code encodes 28 data bits (i.e. seven 4-bitsymbols) and 20 redundancy bits (i.e. five 4-bit symbols) in eachcodeword. Its error-detecting capacity is five symbols. Itserror-correcting capacity is two symbols.

As shown in FIG. 35, codeword coordinates are indexed in coefficientorder, and the data bit ordering follows the codeword bit ordering.

A punctured 2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code is a 2⁴-ary (15,7)Reed-Solomon code with three redundancy coordinates removed. The removedcoordinates are the most significant redundancy coordinates.

The code has the following primitive polynominal:p(x)=x ⁴ +x+1

The code has the following generator polynominal:g(x)=(x+α)(x+α ²) . . . (x+α ⁸)

For a detailed description of Reed-Solomon codes, refer to Wicker, S. B.and V. K. Bhargava, eds., Reed-Solomon Codes and Their Applications,IEEE Press, 1994.

Tag Coordinate Space

The tag coordinate space has two orthogonal axes labelled x and yrespectively. When the positive x axis points to the right then thepositive y axis points down.

The surface coding does not specify the location of the tag coordinatespace origin on a particular tagged surface, nor the orientation of thetag coordinate space with respect to the surface. This information isapplication-specific. For example, if the tagged surface is a sheet ofpaper, then the application which prints the tags onto the paper mayrecord the actual offset and orientation, and these can be used tonormalise any digital ink subsequently captured in conjunction with thesurface.

The position encoded in a tag is defined in units of tags. Tagcoordinates are arranged as shown in in FIG. 36, where the tag withcoordinate (0,0) is a P type tag. By convention, the position of a tagwith an even y coordinate is defined to be the position of the center ofthe tag. The position of a tag with an odd y coordinate is thereforedefined to be the position of the midpoint between the center of the tagand the center of its neighboring tag on the left.

Horizontal and vertical tag units, based on center-to-center tag tagspacings, are given by:

$u_{x} = {{{4\left( {2\sqrt{3}s} \right)} + {2d}} \cong {14.1s}}$$u_{y} = {{{6\left( {2s} \right)} + {2\left( {d\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}} \right)}} \cong {12.2s}}$where d is the inter-segment spacing given byd=(1−√{square root over (3)}/2)s

If the three tag types P, Q and R are assigned values 0, 1 and 2respectively, then the type t of a tag is inferred from its (x,y)coordinate as follows. If y is even, then:t=x modulo 3if y is odd, then:t=(x−1)modulo 3Tag Information Content

Table 7 defines the information fields embedded in the surface coding.Table 8 defines how these fields map to codewords.

TABLE 7 Field Definitions field width description per tag X coordinate10 The unsigned x coordinate of the tag allows a maximum x coordinatevalue of approximately 2.1 m (based on EQ 4). Y coordinate 10 Theunsigned y coordinate of the tag allows a maximum y coordinate value ofapproximately 1.8 m (based on EQ 5. active area flag 1 A flag indicatingwhether the tag is a member of an active area. b′1′ indicatesmembership. active area map flag 1 A flag indicating whether an activearea map is present. b′1′ indicates the presence of a map (see nextfield). If the map is absent then the value of each map entry is derivedfrom the active area flag (see previous field). active area map 6 A mapof which of the tag's immediate six neighbours are members of an activearea. b′1′ indicates membership - FIG. 37 indicates the bit ordering ofthe map data fragment 6 A fragment of an embedded data stream. Onlypresent if the active area map is absent. per tag group encoding format12 The format of the encoding. 0: the present encoding Other values areTBA. macrodot spacing 16 The difference between the actual macrodotadjustment spacing and the nominal macrodot spacing, in nm units, insign-magnitude format - the nominal macrodot spacing is 142875 nm (basedon 1600 dpi and 9 dots per macrodot) region flags 12 Flags controllingthe interpretation and routing of region-related information. 0: regionID is an EPC 1: region is linked 2: region is interactive 3: region issigned 4: region includes data 5: region relates to mobile applicationOther bits are reserved and must be zero. region ID 112 The ID of theregion containing the tags. CRC 16 A CRC (CCITT CRC-16) of tag groupdata.

The active area map indicates whether the corresponding tags are membersof an active area. An active area is an area within which any capturedinput should be immediately forwarded to the corresponding Hyperlabelserver for interpretation. It also allows the Hyperlabel sensing deviceto signal to the user that the input will have an immediate effect.

TABLE 8 Mapping of fields to codewords codeword field field codewordbits width bits field A  9:0 10 all x coordinate  19:10 10 all ycoordinate 20 1 all active area flag 21 1 all active area map flag 27:22 6 all active area map  27:22 6 all data fragment B 11:0 12 allEncoding format  27:12 16 all Macrodot spacing adjustment C 11:0 12 allregion flags  27:12 16 27:12 region ID D 27:0 28 55:28 E 27:0 28 83:56 F27:0 28 111:84  G 11:0 12 11:0   27:12 16 all CRCEmbedded Data

If the “region includes data” flag in the region flags is set then thesurface coding contains embedded data. The data is encoded in multiplecontiguous tags' data fragments, and is replicated in the surface codingas many times as it will fit.

The embedded data is encoded in such a way that a random and partialscan of the surface coding containing the embedded data can besufficient to retrieve the entire data. The scanning system reassemblesthe data from retrieved fragments, and reports to the user whensufficient fragments have been retrieved without error.

As shown in Table 9, a 216-bit data block encodes 160 bits of data.

TABLE 9 Embedded data block field width Description data type 16 Thetype of the data in the superblock. Values include: 0: type iscontrolled by region flags 1: MIME Other values are TBA. superblockwidth 12 The width of the superblock, in blocks. superblock height 12The height of the superblock, in blocks. data 160 The block data. CRC 16A CRC of the block data. total 216

The block data is encoded in the data fragments of a contiguous group of36 tags arranged in a 6×6 square as shown in FIG. 38. A tag belongs to ablock whose integer x and y coordinates are the tag's x and ycoordinates divided by 6. Within each block the data is arranged intotags with increasing x coordinate within increasing y coordinate.

A data fragment may be missing from a block where an active area map ispresent. However, the missing data fragment is likely to be recoverablefrom another copy of the block.

Data of arbitrary size is encoded into a superblock consisting of acontiguous set of blocks arranged in a rectangle. The size of thesuperblock is encoded in each block. A block belongs to a superblockwhose integer coordinate is the block's coordinate divided by thesuperblock size. Within each superblock the data is arranged into blockswith increasing x coordinate within increasing y coordinate.

The superblock is replicated in the surface coding as many times as itwill fit, including partially along the edges of the surface coding.

The data encoded in the superblock may include more precise typeinformation, more precise size information, and more extensive errordetection and/or correction data.

General Considerations

Cryptographic Signature of Region ID

If the “region is signed” flag in the region flags is set then thesurface coding contains a 160-bit cryptographic signature of the regionID. The signature is encoded in a one-block superblock.

In an online environment any signature fragment can be used, inconjunction with the region ID, to validate the signature. In an offlineenvironment the entire signature can be recovered by reading multipletags, and can then be validated using the corresponding public signaturekey.

MIME Data

If the embedded data type is “MIME” then the superblock containsMultipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) data according to RFC 2045(Freed, N., and N. Borenstein, “Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions(MIME)—Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies”, RFC 2045, November1996), RFC 2046 (Freed, N., and N. Borenstein, “Multipurpose InternetMail Extensions (MIME)—Part Two: Media Types”, RFC 2046, November 1996)and related RFCs. The MIME data consists of a header followed by a body.The header is encoded as a variable-length text string preceded by an8-bit string length. The body is encoded as a variable-lengthtype-specific octet stream preceded by a 16-bit size in big-endianformat.

The basic top-level media types described in RFC 2046 include text,image, audio, video and application.

RFC 2425 (Howes, T., M. Smith and F. Dawson, “A MIME Content-Type forDirectory Information”, RFC 2045, September 1998) and RFC 2426 (Dawson,F., and T. Howes, “vCard MIME Directory Profile”, RFC 2046, September1998) describe a text subtype for directory information suitable, forexample, for encoding contact information which might appear on abusiness card.

Encoding and Printing Considerations

The Print Engine Controller (PEC) (which is the subject of a number ofpending U.S. patent applications, including: Ser. Nos. 09/575,108;10/727,162; 09/575,110; 09/607,985; U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,398,332; 6,394,573;6,622,923) supports the encoding of two fixed (per-page) 2⁴-ary (15,7)Reed-Solomon codewords and four variable (per-tag) 2⁴-ary (15,7)Reed-Solomon codewords, although other numbers of codewords can be usedfor different schemes.

Furthermore, PEC supports the rendering of tags via a rectangular unitcell whose layout is constant (per page) but whose variable codeworddata may vary from one unit cell to the next. PEC does not allow unitcells to overlap in the direction of page movement.

A unit cell compatible with PEC contains a single tag group consistingof four tags. The tag group contains a single A codeword unique to thetag group but replicated four times within the tag group, and fourunique B codewords. These can be encoded using five of PEC's sixsupported variable codewords. The tag group also contains eight fixed Cand D codewords. One of these can be encoded using the remaining one ofPEC's variable codewords, two more can be encoded using PEC's two fixedcodewords, and the remaining five can be encoded and pre-rendered intothe Tag Format Structure (TFS) supplied to PEC.

PEC imposes a limit of 32 unique bit addresses per TFS row. The contentsof the unit cell respect this limit. PEC also imposes a limit of 384 onthe width of the TFS. The contents of the unit cell respect this limit.

Note that for a reasonable page size, the number of variable coordinatebits in the A codeword is modest, making encoding via a lookup tabletractable. Encoding of the B codeword via a lookup table may also bepossible. Note that since a Reed-Solomon code is systematic, only theredundancy data needs to appear in the lookup table.

Imaging and Decoding Considerations

The minimum imaging field of view required to guarantee acquisition ofan entire tag has a diameter of 39.6s, i.e.(2×(12+2))√{square root over (2)}sallowing for arbitrary alignment between the surface coding and thefield of view. Given a macrodot spacing of 143 μm, this gives a requiredfield of view of 5.7 mm.

Table 10 gives pitch ranges achievable for the present surface codingfor different sampling rates, assuming an image sensor size of 128pixels.

TABLE 10 Pitch ranges achievable for present surface coding fordifferent sampling rates, computed using Optimize Hyperlabel Optics; dotpitch = 1600 dpi, macrodot pitch = 9 dots, viewing distance = 30 mm,nib-to-FOV separation = 1 mm, image sensor size = 128 pixels samplingrate pitch range 2 −40 to

 49 2.5 −27 to

 36 3 −10 to

 18

For the surface coding of the first example, the corresponding decodingsequence is as follows:

-   -   locate targets of complete tag    -   infer perspective transform from targets    -   sample and decode any one of tag's four codewords    -   determine codeword type and hence tag orientation    -   sample and decode required local (A and B) codewords    -   codeword redundancy is only 12 bits, so only detect errors    -   on decode error flag bad position sample    -   determine tag x-y location, with reference to tag orientation    -   infer 3D tag transform from oriented targets    -   determine nib x-y location from tag x-y location and 3D        transform    -   determine active area status of nib location with reference to        active area map    -   generate local feedback based on nib active area status    -   determine tag type from A codeword    -   sample and decode required global (C and D) codewords (modulo        window alignment, with reference to tag type)    -   although codeword redundancy is only 12 bits, correct errors;        subsequent CRC verification will detect erroneous error        correction    -   verify tag group data CRC    -   on decode error flag bad region ID sample    -   determine encoding type, and reject unknown encoding    -   determine region flags    -   determine region ID    -   encode region ID, nib x-y location, nib active area status in        digital ink    -   route digital ink based on region flags

Note that region ID decoding need not occur at the same rate as positiondecoding.

Note that decoding of a codeword can be avoided if the codeword is foundto be identical to an already-known good codeword.

For the surface coding of the alternative first example, thecorresponding decoding sequence is as follows:

-   -   locate targets of complete tag    -   infer perspective transform from targets    -   sample cyclic position code    -   decode cyclic position code    -   determine orientation from cyclic position code    -   sample and decode local Reed-Solomon codeword    -   determine tag x-y location    -   infer 3D tag transform from oriented targets    -   determine nib x-y location from tag x-y location and 3D        transform    -   determine active area status of nib location with reference to        active area map    -   generate local feedback based on nib active area status    -   determine tag type    -   sample distributed Reed-Solomon codewords (modulo window        alignment, with reference to tag type)    -   decode distributed Reed-Solomon codewords    -   verify tag group data CRC    -   on decode error flag bad region ID sample    -   determine encoding type, and reject unknown encoding    -   determine region flags    -   determine region ID    -   encode region ID, nib x-y location, nib active area status in        digital ink    -   route digital ink based on region flags

Region ID decoding need not occur at the same rate as position decodingand decoding of a codeword can be avoided if the codeword is found to beidentical to an already-known good codeword.

If the high-order coordinate width is non-zero, then special care mustbe taken on boundaries between tags where the low-order x or ycoordinate wraps, otherwise codeword errors may be introduced. Ifwrapping is detected from the low-order x or y coordinate (i.e. itcontains all zero bits or all one bits), then the correspondinghigh-order coordinate can be adjusted before codeword decoding. In theabsence of genuine symbol errors in the high-order coordinate, this willprevent the inadvertent introduction of codeword errors.

Expanded Tag

The tag can be expanded to increase its data capacity by addingadditional bands of symbols about its circumference. This appendixdescribes an expanded tag with one additional band of symbols. While thetag described in the main part of the document has a raw capacity of 36symbols, the expanded tag has a raw capacity of 60 symbols.

The capacity of the expanded tag is precisely sufficient to allow theinclusion of a complete 160-bit digital signature in each tag group.This allows complete digital signature verification on a “single-click”interaction with the surface coding.

Tag Structure

FIG. 39 shows the structure of a complete (P type) expanded tag. Apartfrom the additional band of symbols and the related change in thepositions of the targets, it has a similar physical structure to the tagdescribed earlier.

In the expanded tag the macrodot spacing s has a nominal value of 111μm, based on 7 dots printed at a pitch of 1600 dots per inch.

A macrodot is nominally circular with a nominal diameter of (3/7)s.

A target is nominally circular with a nominal diameter of (10/7)s.

The expanded tag, like the tag described earlier, also participates in atag group, and each expanded tag has one of the three possible tag typesP, Q and R.

The expanded tag, like the tag described earlier, contains anorientation-indicating cyclic position code.

Local Codeword

The expanded tag locally contains one complete codeword which is used toencode information unique to the tag. The codeword is of a punctured2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code. The tag therefore encodes up to 28 bitsof information unique to the tag.

The layout of the local codeword is shown in FIG. 40.

Distributed Codewords

The expanded tag contains fragments of twelve codewords, labelled Bthrough M, which are distributed across three adjacent tags and whichare used to encode information common to a set of contiguous tags. Eachcodeword is of a punctured 2⁴-ary (12,7) Reed-Solomon code. Any threeadjacent tags therefore together encode up to 336 bits of informationcommon to a set of contiguous tags.

The layout of the first four fragments of the six codewords B through Gin tag type P is shown in FIG. 41. The layout in the other tag typesfollows the layout in tag type P, with symbols 4 through 7 in tag typeQ, and fragments 8 through 11 in tag type Q.

The layout of the first four fragments of the six codewords H through Min tag type P is shown in FIG. 42. The layout in the other tag typesfollows the layout in tag type P, with symbols 4 through 7 in tag typeQ, and fragments 8 through 11 in tag type Q.

As shown earlier in FIG. 37, the tiling guarantees the any set of threeadjacent tags contains one tag of each type, and therefore contains acomplete set of distributed codewords. The tag type, used to determinethe registration of the distributed codewords with respect to aparticular set of adjacent tags, is inferred from the x-y coordinateencoded in the local codeword of each tag.

Tag Coordinate Space

The tag coordinate space encoded in the expanded tag is identical tothat encoded in the tag described earlier, with the exception that tagunits are different (due both to the change in tag structure and thechange in macrodot spacing).

Horizontal and vertical tag units, based on center-to-center tag tagspacings, are given by:

$u_{x} = {{{5\left( {2\sqrt{3}s} \right)} + {2d}} \cong {17.6s}}$$u_{y} = {{{7.5\left( {2s} \right)} + {2\left( {d\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}} \right)}} \cong {15.2s}}$where d is the inter-segment spacing given byd=(1−√{square root over (3)}/2)sTag Information Content

Table 11 defines the information fields embedded in the expanded tagsurface coding. Table 12 defines how these fields map to codewords.

TABLE 11 Field definitions Field width description per tag x coordinate10 The unsigned x coordinate of the tag - allows a maximum x coordinatevalue of approximately 2.0 m (based on EQ 8). y coordinate 10 Theunsigned y coordinate of the tag - allows a maximum y coordinate valueof approximately 1.7 m (based on EQ 9) active area flag 1 A flagindicating whether the tag is a member of an active area. b′1′ indicatesmembership. active area map 1 A flag indicating whether an active areamap is flag present. b′1′ indicates the presence of a map (see nextfield). If the map is absent then the value of each map entry is derivedfrom the active area flag (see previous field). active area map 6 A mapof which of the tag's immediate six neighbours are members of an activearea. b′1′ indicates membership - FIG. 37 indicates the bit ordering ofthe map data fragment 6 A fragment of an embedded data stream. Onlypresent if the active area map is absent. per tag group encoding format12 The format of the encoding. Refer to Table 5 for values. macrodotspacing 16 The difference between the actual macrodot adjustment spacingand the nominal macrodot spacing, in nm units, in sign-magnitudeformat - the nominal macrodot spacing is 111125 nm (based on 1600 dpiand 7 dots per macrodot region flags 12 Flags controlling theinterpretation and routing of region-related information. Refer to Table5 for values. region ID 112 The ID of the region containing the tags.Signature 160 A digital signature of the region ID. CRC 16 A CRC (CCITTCRC-16) of tag group data.

TABLE 12 Mapping of fields to codewords codeword field field codewordbits width bits field A  9:0 10 all x coordinate  19:10 10 all ycoordinate 20 1 all active area flag 21 1 all active area map flag 27:22 6 all active area map  27:22 6 all data fragment B 11:0 12 allencoding format  27:12 16 all macrodot spacing adjustment C 11:0 12 allregion flags  27:12 16 27:12 region ID D 27:0 28 55:28 E 27:0 28 83:56 F27:0 28 111:84  G 11:0 12 11:0   27:12 16 all CRC H 27:0 28 27:0 signature I 27:0 28 55:28 J 27:0 28 83:56 K 27:0 28 111:84  L 27:0 28139:112 M 19:0 20 159:140  27:20 8 all unusedEncoding and Printing Considerations

The tag group unit cell of the expanded tag only respects PEC's TFSwidth limit if the macrodot spacing is reduced from 9 to 7 dots, asreflected in the macrodot spacing s of 111 μm.

Imaging and Decoding Considerations

The minimum imaging field of view required to guarantee acquisition ofan entire expanded tag has a diameter of 44s i.e.2(1+8+2)2s),allowing for arbitrary alignment between the surface coding and thefield of view. Given a macrodot spacing of 111 μm this gives a requiredfield of view of approximately 4.0 mm.Surface Coding SecuritySecurity Requirements

Item security can be defined to have two related purposes:

-   -   to allow authentication of an item    -   to prevent forgery of an item

The greater the difficulty of forgery, the greater the trustworthinessof authentication. When an item is coded, Hyperlabel surface codingsecurity has two corresponding purposes:

-   -   to allow authentication of a coded item    -   to prevent forgery of a coded item with a novel item ID

If a user is able to determine the authenticity of the surface coding ofan item, then the user may be able to make an informed decision aboutthe likely authenticity of the item.

If it is intractable to forge the surface coding for a novel ID, thenthe only tractable way of forging an item with an authentic surfacecoding is to duplicate the surface coding of an existing item (and henceits ID). If the user is able to determine by other means that the ID ofan item is likely to be unique, then the user may assume that the itemis authentic.

Since the Hyperlabel surface coding allows meaningful interactionbetween a sensing device and a coded surface during a purely localinteraction, it is desirable for the surface coding to supportauthentication during a similarly local interaction, i.e. withoutrequiring an increase in the size of the sensing device field of view.

Since no a priori relationship exists between creators of authenticcoded items and users potentially wishing to authenticate such items, itis undesirable to require a trust relationship between creators andusers. For example, it is undesirable to require that creators sharesecret signature keys with users.

It is reasonable for many users to rely on online access to anauthenticator trusted by a creator for the purposes of authenticatingitems. Conversely, it is desirable to allow authentication to take placein the absence of online access.

Security Discussion

As described above, authentication relies on verifying thecorrespondence between data and a signature of that data. The greaterthe difficulty in forging a signature, the greater the trustworthinessof signature-based authentication.

The item ID is unique and therefore provides a basis for a signature. Ifonline authentication access is assumed, then the signature may simplybe a random number associated with the item ID in an authenticationdatabase accessible to the trusted online authenticator. The randomnumber may be generated by any suitable method, such as via adeterministic (pseudo-random) algorithm, or via a stochastic physicalprocess. A keyed hash or encrypted hash may be preferable to a randomnumber since it requires no additional space in the authenticationdatabase. However, a random signature of the same length as a keyedsignature is more secure than the keyed signature since it is notsusceptible to key attacks. Equivalently, a shorter random signatureconfers the same security as a longer keyed signature.

In the limit case no signature is actually required, since the merepresence of the item ID in the database indicates authenticity. However,the use of a signature limits a forger to forging items he has actuallysighted.

To prevent forgery of a signature for an unsighted ID, the signaturemust be large enough to make exhaustive search via repeated accesses tothe online authenticator intractable. If the signature is generatedusing a key rather than randomly, then its length must also be largeenough to prevent the forger from deducing the key from knownID-signature pairs. Signatures of a few hundred bits are consideredsecure, whether generated using private or secret keys.

While it may be practical to include a reasonably secure randomsignature in a tag (or local tag group), particularly if the length ofthe ID is reduced to provide more space for the signature, it may beimpractical to include a secure ID-derived signature in a tag. Tosupport a secure ID-derived signature, we can instead distributefragments of the signature across multiple tags. If each fragment can beverified in isolation against the ID, then the goal of supportingauthentication without increasing the sensing device field of view isachieved. The security of the signature can still derive from the fulllength of the signature rather than from the length of a fragment, sincea forger cannot predict which fragment a user will randomly choose toverify. A trusted authenticator can always perform fragment verificationsince they have access to the key and/or the full stored signature, sofragment verification is always possible when online access to a trustedauthenticator is available.

Fragment verification requires that we prevent brute force attacks onindividual fragments, otherwise a forger can determine the entiresignature by attacking each fragment in turn. A brute force attack canbe prevented by throttling the authenticator on a per-ID basis. However,if fragments are short, then extreme throttling is required. As analternative to throttling the authenticator, the authenticator caninstead enforce a limit on the number of verification requests it iswilling to respond to for a given fragment number. Even if the limit ismade quite small, it is unlikely that a normal user will exhaust it fora given fragment, since there will be many fragments available and theactual fragment chosen by the user can vary. Even a limit of one can bepractical. More generally, the limit should be proportional to the sizeof the fragment, i.e. the smaller the fragment the smaller the limit.Thus the experience of the user would be somewhat invariant of fragmentsize. Both throttling and enforcing fragment verification limits implyserialisation of requests to the authenticator. A fragment verificationlimit need only be imposed once verification fails, i.e. an unlimitednumber of successful verifications can occur before the first failure.Enforcing fragment verification limits further requires theauthenticator to maintain a per-fragment count of satisfied verificationrequests.

A brute force attack can also be prevented by concatenating the fragmentwith a random signature encoded in the tag. While the random signaturecan be thought of as protecting the fragment, the fragment can also bethought of as simply increasing the length of the random signature andhence increasing its security. A fragment verification limit can makeverification subject to a denial of service attack, where an attackerdeliberately exceeds the limit with invalid verification request inorder to prevent further verification of the item ID in question. Thiscan be prevented by only enforcing the fragment verification limit for afragment when the accompanying random signature is correct.

Fragment verification may be made more secure by requiring theverification of a minimum number of fragments simultaneously.

Fragment verification requires fragment identification. Fragments may beexplicitly numbered, or may more economically be identified by thetwo-dimensional coordinate of their tag, modulo the repetition of thesignature across a continuous tiling of tags.

The limited length of the ID itself introduces a further vulnerability.Ideally it should be at least a few hundred bits. In the netpage surfacecoding scheme it is 96 bits or less. To overcome this the ID may bepadded. For this to be effective the padding must be variable, i.e. itmust vary from one ID to the next. Ideally the padding is simply arandom number, and must then be stored in the authentication databaseindexed by ID. If the padding is deterministically generated from the IDthen it is worthless.

Offline authentication of secret-key signatures requires the use of atrusted offline authentication device. The QA chip (which is the subjectof a number of pending U.S. patent applications, including Ser. Nos.09/112,763; 09/112,762; 09/112,737; 09/112,761; 09/113,223) provides thebasis for such a device, although of limited capacity. The QA chip canbe programmed to verify a signature using a secret key securely held inits internal memory. In this scenario, however, it is impractical tosupport per-ID padding, and it is impractical even to support more thana very few secret keys. Furthermore, a QA chip programmed in this manneris susceptible to a chosen-message attack. These constraints limit theapplicability of a QA-chip-based trusted offline authentication deviceto niche applications.

In general, despite the claimed security of any particular trustedoffline authentication device, creators of secure items are likely to bereluctant to entrust their secret signature keys to such devices, andthis is again likely to limit the applicability of such devices to nicheapplications.

By contrast, offline authentication of public-key signatures (i.e.generated using the corresponding private keys) is highly practical. Anoffline authentication device utilising public keys can trivially holdany number of public keys, and may be designed to retrieve additionalpublic keys on demand, via a transient online connection, when itencounters an ID for which it knows it has no corresponding publicsignature key. Untrusted offline authentication is likely to beattractive to most creators of secure items, since they are able toretain exclusive control of their private signature keys.

A disadvantage of offline authentication of a public-key signature isthat the entire signature must be acquired from the coding, violatingour desire to support authentication with a minimal field of view. Acorresponding advantage of offline authentication of a public-keysignature is that access to the ID padding is no longer required, sincedecryption of the signature using the public signature key generatesboth the ID and its padding, and the padding can then be ignored. Aforger can not take advantage of the fact that the padding is ignoredduring offline authentication, since the padding is not ignored duringonline authentication.

Acquisition of an entire distributed signature is not particularlyonerous. Any random or linear swipe of a hand-held sensing device acrossa coded surface allows it to quickly acquire all of the fragments of thesignature. The sensing device can easily be programmed to signal theuser when it has acquired a full set of fragments and has completedauthentication. A scanning laser can also easily acquire all of thefragments of the signature. Both kinds of devices may be programmed toonly perform authentication when the tags indicate the presence of asignature.

Note that a public-key signature may be authenticated online via any ofits fragments in the same way as any signature, whether generatedrandomly or using a secret key. The trusted online authenticator maygenerate the signature on demand using the private key and ID padding,or may store the signature explicitly in the authentication database.The latter approach obviates the need to store the ID padding.

Note also that signature-based authentication may be used in place offragment-based authentication even when online access to a trustedauthenticator is available.

Table 13 provides a summary of which signature schemes are workable inlight of the foregoing discussion.

TABLE 13 Summary of workable signature schemes encoding acquisitionsignature online offline in tags from tags generation authenticationauthentication Local full random ok Impractical to store per IDinformation secret key Signature too Undesirable to short to be storesecret secure keys private Signature too key short to be secureDistributed fragment(s) random ok impractical^(b) secret key okimpractical^(c) private ok impractical^(b) key full random okimpractical^(b) secret key ok impractical^(c) private ok ok keySecurity Specification

FIG. 43 shows an example item signature object model.

An item has an ID (X) and other details (not shown). It optionally has asecret signature (Z). It also optionally has a public-key signature. Thepublic-key signature records the signature (S) explicitly, and/orrecords the padding (P) used in conjunction with the ID to generate thesignature. The public-key signature has an associated public-private keypair (K, L). The key pair is associated with a one or more ranges ofitem IDs.

Typically issuers of security documents and pharmaceuticals will utilisea range of IDs to identify a range of documents or the like. Followingthis, the issuer will then use these details to generate respective IDsfor each item, or document to be marked.

Authentication of the product can then be performed online or offline bysensing the tag data encoded within the tag, and performing theauthentication using a number of different mechanisms depending on thesituation.

Examples of the processes involved will now be described for public andprivate key encryption respectively.

Authentication Based on Public-Key Signature

Setup per ID Range:

-   -   generate public-private signature key pair (K, L)    -   store key pair (K, L) indexed by ID range        Setup per ID:    -   generate ID padding (P)    -   retrieve private signature key (L) by ID (X)    -   generate signature (S) by encrypting ID (X) and padding (P)        using private key (L):        S←E _(L)(X,P)    -   store signature (S) in database indexed by ID (X) (and/or store        padding (P))    -   encode ID (X) in all tag groups    -   encode signature (S) across multiple tags in repeated fashion        Online Fragment-Based Authentication (User):    -   acquire ID (X) from tags    -   acquire position (x, y)_(i) and signature fragment (T_(i)) from        tag    -   generate fragment number (i) from position (x, y)_(i):        i←F[(x,y)_(i)]    -   look up trusted authenticator by ID (X)    -   transmit ID (X), fragment (S_(i)) and fragment number (i) to        trusted authenticator        Online Fragment-Based Authentication (Trusted Authenticator):    -   receive ID (X), fragment (S_(i)) and fragment number (i) from        user    -   retrieve signature (S) from database by ID (X) (or re-generate        signature)    -   compare received fragment (T_(i)) with corresponding fragment of        signature (S_(i))    -   report authentication result to user        Offline Signature-Based Authentication (User):    -   acquire ID from tags (X)    -   acquire positions (x, y)_(i) and signature fragments (T_(i))        from tag    -   generate fragment numbers (i) from positions (x, y)_(i):        i←F[(x,y)_(i)]        S←S ₀ |S ₁ | . . . |S _(n-1)    -   generate signature (S) from (n) fragments:    -   retrieve public signature key (K) by ID (X)    -   decrypt signature (S) using public key (K) to obtain ID (X′) and        padding (P′):        X′|P′←D _(K)(S)    -   compare acquired ID (X) with decrypted ID (X′)    -   report authentication result to user        Authentication Based on Secret-Key Signature        Setup per ID:    -   generate secret (Z)    -   store secret (Z) in database indexed by ID (X)    -   encode ID (X) and secret (Z) in all tag groups        Online Secret-Based Authentication (User):    -   acquire ID (X) from tags    -   acquire secret (Z′) from tags    -   look up trusted authenticator by ID    -   transmit ID (X) and secret (Z′) to trusted authenticator        Online Secret-Based Authentication (Trusted Authenticator):    -   receive ID (X) and secret (Z′) from user    -   retrieve secret (Z) from database by ID (X)    -   compared received secret (Z′) with secret (Z)    -   report authentication result to user

As discussed earlier, secret-based authentication may be used inconjunction with fragment-based authentication.

Cryptographic Algorithms

When the public-key signature is authenticated offline, the user'sauthentication device typically does not have access to the padding usedwhen the signature was originally generated. The signature verificationstep must therefore decrypt the signature to allow the authenticationdevice to compare the ID in the signature with the ID acquired from thetags. This precludes the use of algorithms which don't perform thesignature verification step by decrypting the signature, such as thestandard Digital Signature Algorithm U.S. Department ofCommerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology, DigitalSignature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-2, 27 Jan. 2000.

RSA encryption is described in:

-   -   Rivest, R. L., A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A Method for        Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems”,        Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21, No. 2, February 1978, pp.        120-126    -   Rivest, R. L., A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman, “Cryptographic        communications system and method”, U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829,        issued 20 Sep. 1983    -   RSA Laboratories, PKCS #1 v2.0: RSA Encryption Standard, Oct. 1,        1998

RSA provides a suitable public-key digital signature algorithm thatdecrypts the signature. RSA provides the basis for the ANSI X9.31digital signature standard American National Standards Institute, ANSIX9.31-1998, Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptographyfor the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), Sep. 8, 1998. If no paddingis used, then any public-key signature algorithm can be used.

In the Hyperlabel surface coding scheme the ID is 96 bits long or less.It is padded to 160 bits prior to being signed.

The padding is ideally generated using a truly random process, such as aquantum process [14,15], or by distilling randomness from random eventsSchneier, B., Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons1996.

In the Hyperlabel surface coding scheme the random signature, or secret,is 36 bits long or less. It is also ideally generated using a trulyrandom process. If a longer random signature is required, then thelength of the item ID in the surface coding can be reduced to provideadditional space for the signature.

Security Tagging and Tracking

Currency, checks and other monetary documents can be tagged in order todetect currency counterfeiting and counter money laundering activities.The Hyperlabel tagged currency can be validated, and tracked through themonetary system. Hyperlabel tagged products such as pharmaceuticals canbe tagged allowing items to be validated and tracked through thedistribution and retail system.

A number of examples of the concepts of Hyperlabel security tagging andtracking referring specifically to bank notes and pharmaceuticals,however Hyperlabel tagging can equally be used to securely tag and trackother products, for example, traveller's checks, demand deposits,passports, chemicals etc.

Hyperlabel tagging, with the netpage system, provides a mechanism forsecurely validating and tracking objects.

Hyperlabel tags on the surface of an object uniquely identify theobject. Each Hyperlabel tag contains information including the object'sunique ID, and the tag's location on the Hyperlabel tagged surface. AHyperlabel tag also contains a signature fragment which can be used toauthenticate the object. A scanning laser or image sensor can read thetags on any part of the object to identify the object, validate theobject, and allow tracking of the object.

Currency Tagging

Currency may be tagged with Hyperlabels in order to detectcounterfeiting and allow tracking of currency movement. Hyperlabel tagscan be printed over the entire bank note surface or can be printed in asmaller region of the note. Hyperlabel tagging can be used in additionto other security features such as holograms, foil strips,colour-shifting inks etc. A scanning laser or image sensor can read thetags on any part of the note to validate each individual note.

A Hyperlabel currency tag identifies the note currency, issue country,and note denomination. It also identifies the note's serial number, thenote side (i.e. front or back), and it may contain other information(for example, the exact printing works where the note was printed).There are two note IDs for each physical bank note—one for each side ofthe note.

Each time a note is scanned its location is recorded. This locationinformation can be collected in a central database allowing analysis andidentification of abnormal money movements and detection of counterfeitnotes. For example, in the case of sophisticated forgeries whereHyperlabel dot patterns are exactly duplicated, there will be multiplecopies of exactly forged notes (at a minimum, the original and theforgery). If multiple identical notes appear in different places at thesame time, all but one of the notes must be a forgery. All can then betreated as suspect.

Hyperlabel currency tags can be read by any Hyperlabel scanner. Thesescanners can be incorporated into a variety of devices to facilitateauthentication and tracking, for example, automated teller machines,currency counters, and vending machines. Scanners may also beincorporated into devices such as:

-   -   Currency counters    -   Automated teller machines    -   Cash registers    -   POS checkouts    -   Mobile phone with inbuilt scanner    -   Netpage pens    -   Vending machines    -   Hyperlabel Supermarket Checkout    -   Mobile Phone with Inbuilt Scanner    -   Handheld Validity Scanner

Such scanners are multi-purpose since they can also be used to scanHyperlabel tagged consumer goods and printed materials. A smallhand-held scanner may also be used to scan and validate currency. When ascanner scans a note it notifies the currency server of the notedetails, the current date and time, and the scanner location (if known).Optionally the scanner may also send the identity of the person makingthe cash transaction, if known. This information would be available inrespect of bank transactions, currency exchanges and large cashtransactions.

Currency tagging is discussed in further detail in copending patentapplication Ser. Nos. 11/041,651, 11/041,609, 11/041,652, 11/041,649 and11/041,610, the contents of which are all incorporated herein byreference.

Pharmaceutical Tagging

Hyperlabel tags can be printed over the entire surface of thepharmaceutical packaging, or only on a smaller area of the packaging. AHyperlabel pharmaceutical tag contains the item's product ID and aserial number, to uniquely identify an individual item. The product IDidentifies the item's National Drug Code (NDC) number. The NDC number isallocated and administered by the FDA (U.S. Food and DrugAdministration) for drugs and drug-related items and identifies theproduct and manufacturer. Alternatively the tag may contain anotherproduct ID code, such as the European International Article Numbering(EAN) code, or EPC etc.

The pharmaceutical ID can be read by a scanner and used to look updetails of the item's lot number and expiry date. Alternatively the lotnumber and expiry date may be contained in the pharmaceutical tag toallow off-line retrieval of this information by any scanner. Thepharmaceutical ID may also be used to access details such as dosage andadministration information, drug interactions, precautions,contraindications, product warnings, recall information, place ofmanufacture etc.

Each time a pharmaceutical item is scanned its location is recorded.This location information can be collected in a central databaseallowing analysis and identification of abnormal product movements anddetection of counterfeit pharmaceuticals.

Suitable scanners can include:

-   -   Cash registers    -   POS checkouts    -   Mobile phone with inbuilt scanner    -   Netpage pens    -   Vending machines        Tracking

For the purpose of tracking and item validation the manufacturer, orother central authority, maintains a database which tracks the locationand status of all items.

Hyperlabel scanners can be built into a variety of devices. Scanners maybe fixed or mobile. A fixed scanner has a permanent, known location. Amobile scanner has no fixed location. A scanner may be on-line, i.e.have immediate access to the central database, or it may be off-line.

Scanners may be specific to a particular product application, such as acurrency counter, or may be a generic Hyperlabel scanner. Hyperlabelscanners may be embedded in other multi-function devices, for example, amobile phone or PDA.

A central database maintains up-to-date information on valid object IDs,an object ID hotlist (for all suspect object IDs), and a list of publickeys corresponding to object IDs. The central server also maintains anobject scanning history to track an object's movements. Each time anobject is scanned, its timestamped location is recorded. If known, thedetails of the object owner may also be recorded. This information maybe known particularly in the case of large financial transactions e.g. alarge cash withdrawal from a bank. This object scanning history data canbe used to detect illegal product movements, for example, the illegalimport of a pharmaceutical. It can also be used to detect abnormal orsuspicious product movements which may be indicative of productcounterfeiting.

If an object is known to be stolen it can be immediately added to anobject ID hotlist on the central server. This hotlist is automaticallydistributed to (or becomes accessible to) all on-line scanners, and willbe downloaded to all off-line scanners on their next update. In this waythe stolen status is automatically and rapidly disseminated to a hugenumber of outlets. Similarly, if an object is in any other way suspectit can be added to the hotlist so that its status is flagged to theperson scanning the object.

An on-line scanner has instant access to the central server to allowchecking of each object ID at the time of scanning. The object scanninghistory is also updated at the central server at the time the object isscanned.

An off-line scanner stores object status data internally to allowvalidation of a scanned object. The object status data includes valid IDrange lists, an object ID hotlist, a public key list, and an objectscanning history. Each time an object is scanned the details arerecorded in the object scanning history. The object status data isdownloaded from the central server, and the object scanning history isuploaded to the central server, each time the scanner connects.

A mobile scanner's location can be provided to the application by thescanner, if it is GPS-equipped. Alternatively the scanner's location canbe provided by the network through which it communicates.

For example, if the hand-held scanner uses the mobile phone network, thescanner's location can be provided by the mobile phone network provider.There are a number of location technologies available. One is AssistedGlobal Positioning System (A-GPS). This requires a GPS-equipped handset,which receives positioning signals from GPS satellites. The phonenetwork knows the approximate location of the handset (in this case thehandset is also the scanner) from the nearest cell site. Based on this,the network tells the handset which GPS satellites to use in itsposition calculations. Another technology, which does not require thedevice to be GPS-equipped, is Uplink Time Difference of Arrival(U-TDOA). This determines the location of a wireless handset, using aform of triangulation, by comparing the time it takes a wirelesshandset's signal to reach several Location Measurement Units (LMUs)installed at the network's cell sites. The handset location is thencalculated based on the differences in arrival times of the three (ormore) signals.

Authentication

Each object ID has a signature. Limited space within the Hyperlabel tagstructure makes it impractical to include a full cryptographic signaturein a tag so signature fragments are distributed across multiple tags. Asmaller random signature, or secret, can be included in a tag.

To avoid any vulnerability due to the limited length of the object ID,the object ID is padded, ideally with a random number. The padding isstored in an authentication database indexed by object ID. Theauthentication database may be managed by the manufacturer, or it may bemanaged by a third-party trusted authenticator.

Each Hyperlabel tag contains a signature fragment and each fragment (ora subset of fragments) can be verified, in isolation, against the objectID. The security of the signature still derives from the full length ofthe signature rather than from the length of the fragment, since aforger cannot predict which fragment a user will randomly choose toverify.

Fragment verification requires fragment identification. Fragments may beexplicitly numbered, or may by identified by the two-dimensionalcoordinate of their tag, modulo the repetition of the signature acrosscontinuous tiling of tags.

Note that a trusted authenticator can always perform fragmentverification, so fragment verification is always possible when on-lineaccess to a trusted authenticator is available.

Establishing Authentication Database

Prior to allocating a new range of IDs, some setup tasks are required toestablish the authentication database.

For each range of IDs a public-private signature key pair is generatedand the key pair is stored in the authentication database, indexed by IDrange.

For each object ID in the range the following setup is required:

-   -   generate ID padding and store in authentication database,        indexed by object ID    -   retrieve private signature key by object ID    -   generate signature by encrypting object ID and padding, using        private key    -   store signature in authentication database indexed by object ID,        and/or store the padding, since the signature can be        re-generated using the ID, padding and private key    -   encode the signature across multiple tags in repeated fashion

This data is required for the Hyperlabel tags therefore theauthentication database must be established prior to, or at the time of,printing of the Hyperlabels.

Security issues are discussed in more detail above.

Off-Line Public-Key-Based Authentication

An off-line authentication device utilises public-key signatures. Theauthentication device holds a number of public keys. The device may,optionally, retrieve additional public keys on demand, via a transienton-line connection when it encounters an object ID for which it has nocorresponding public key signature.

For off-line authentication, the entire signature is needed. Theauthentication device is swiped over the Hyperlabel tagged surface and anumber of tags are read. From this, the object ID is acquired, as wellas a number of signature fragments and their positions. The signature isthen generated from these signature fragments. The public key is lookedup, from the scanning device using the object ID. The signature is thendecrypted using the public key, to give an object ID and padding. If theobject ID obtained from the signature matches the object ID in theHyperlabel tag then the object is considered authentic.

The off-line authentication method can also be used on-line, with thetrusted authenticator playing the role of authenticator.

On-Line Public-Key-Based Authentication

An on-line authentication device uses a trusted authenticator to verifythe authenticity of an object. For on-line authentication a single tagcan be all that is required to perform authentication. Theauthentication device scans the object and acquires one or more tags.From this, the object ID is acquired, as well as at least one signaturefragment and its position. The fragment number is generated from thefragment position. The appropriate trusted authenticator is looked up bythe object ID. The object ID, signature fragment, and fragment numberare sent to the trusted authenticator.

The trusted authenticator receives the data and retrieves the signaturefrom the authentication database by object ID. This signature iscompared with the supplied fragment, and the authentication result isreported to the user.

On-Line Secret-Based Authentication

Alternatively or additionally, if a random signature or secret isincluded in each tag (or tag group), then this can be verified withreference to a copy of the secret accessible to a trusted authenticator.Database setup then includes allocating a secret for each object, andstoring it in the authentication database, indexed by object ID.

The authentication device scans the object and acquires one or moretags. From this, the object ID is acquired, as well as the secret. Theappropriate trusted authenticator is looked up by the object ID. Theobject ID and secret are sent to the trusted authenticator.

The trusted authenticator receives the data and retrieves the secretfrom the authentication database by object ID. This secret is comparedwith the supplied secret, and the authentication result is reported tothe user.

Secret-based authentication can be used in conjunction with on-linefragment-based authentication is discussed in more detail above.

Product Scanning Interactions

Product Scanning at a retailer is illustrated in FIG. 44. When a storeoperator scans a Hyperlabel tagged product the tag data is sent to theservice terminal (A). The service terminal sends the transaction data tothe store server (B). The store server sends this data, along with theretailer details, to the manufacturer server (C). The Hyperlabel serverknows which manufacturer server to send the message to from the objectID. On receipt of the input, the manufacturer server authenticates theobject, if the manufacturer is the trusted authenticator. Alternativelythe manufacturer server passes the data on to the authentication serverto verify the object ID and signature (D). The authentication serversends the authentication result back to the manufacturer server (E). Themanufacturer server checks the status of the object ID (against itsvalid ID lists and hotlist), and sends the response to the store server(F), which in turn send the result back the store service terminal (G).The store server could also communicate with the relevant authenticationserver directly.

The interaction detail for on-line product scanning at a retailer isshown in FIG. 45. The store operator scans the Hyperlabel taggedproduct. The scanner sends the scanner ID and tag data to the serviceterminal. The service terminal sends this data along with the terminalID and scanner location to the store server. The store server then sendsthe request on to the manufacturer server, which performs authentication(either itself or via a third party authentication server) anddetermines the object status. The response is then sent back to thestore server, and on to the operator service terminal.

The interaction detail for off-line product scanning at a retailer isshown in FIG. 46. The store operator scans the Hyperlabel taggedproduct. The scanner sends the scanner ID and tag data from multipletags to the service terminal. The service terminal sends this data,along with the terminal ID and scanner location, to the store server.The store server then performs off-line authentication, as described inSection 3.4.2, and determines the object status through its cachedhotlist, valid object ID lists, and public key list. The store serverrecords the scan details in its internal object scanning history. Theresponse is then sent back to the operator service terminal.

An alternative for off-line product scanner occurs where the scanner isa hand-held, stand-alone scanner. In this case the cached authenticationdata is stored within the scanner itself, and the scanner performs thevalidation internally. The object scanning history is also cached withinthe scanner. Periodically the scanner connects to the central database,uploads it's object scanning history, and downloads the latest publickey list, object ID hotlist and valid ID range list. This connection maybe automatic (and invisible to the user), or may be initiated by theuser, for example, when the scanner is placed in a dockingstation/charger.

Product scanning with a netpage pen or Hyperlabel reader is illustratedin FIG. 47. When a user scans a Hyperlabel tagged item with theirnetpage pen, the input is sent to the netpage System, from the user'snetpage pen, in the usual way (A). To scan a product rather thaninteract with it, the pen can be placed in a special mode. This istypically a one-shot mode, and can be initiated by tapping on a <scan>button printed on a netpage. Alternatively, the pen can have auser-operable button, which, when held down during a tap or swipe, tellsthe pen to treat the interaction as a product scan rather than a normalinteraction. The tag data is transmitted from the pen to the user'snetpage base station. The netpage base station may be the user's mobilephone or PDA, or it may be some other netpage device, such as a PC. Theinput is relayed to the Hyperlabel server (B) and then on tomanufacturer server (C) in the usual way. On receipt of the input, themanufacturer server authenticates the object if the manufacturer is thetrusted authenticator. Alternatively the manufacturer server passes thedata on to the authentication server to verify the object ID andsignature (D). The authentication server sends the authentication resultback to the manufacturer server (E). The manufacturer server checks thestatus of the object ID (against its valid ID lists and hotlist), andsends the response to the Hyperlabel server (G). The Hyperlabel server,as part of the netpage system, can know the identity and devices of theuser. The Hyperlabel server will relay the manufacturer server'sresponse to the user's phone (G) or Web browsing device (H) asappropriate. If the user's netpage pen has LEDs then the Hyperlabelserver can send a command to the user's pen to light the appropriateLED(s) (I,J).

The interaction detail for scanning with a netpage pen is shown in FIG.48. The netpage pen clicks on the Hyperlabel tagged product. The netpagepen sends the pen id, the product's tag data and the pen's location tothe Hyperlabel server. If the pen ID is not already associated with ascanner, the Hyperlabel server may create a new scanner record for thepen, or may use the pen ID as a scanner ID. The Hyperlabel server sendsthe scanner ID, tag data, and scanner location (if known) to themanufacturer server, which performs authentication (either itself or viaa third party authentication server) and determines the object status.The response is then sent back to the Hyperlabel server, and on to theuser's default Web browsing device.

Security Tagging and Tracking Object Model

The Security Tagging and Tracking object model revolves aroundHyperlabel tags, object IDs, and signatures. FIG. 60 illustrates themanagement and organisation of these objects.

As shown in FIG. 49, a Hyperlabel tag comprises a tag type, object ID,two-dimensional position and a signature fragment. The tag typeindicates whether this is a tag on a common object, or whether the tagis on a special type of object such as a currency note or apharmaceutical product. A signature fragment has an optional fragmentnumber which identifies the fragment's place within the full signature.

As described above, a product's unique item ID may be seen as a specialkind of unique object ID. The Electronic Product Code (EPC) is oneemerging standard for an item ID. An item ID typically consists of aproduct ID and a serial number. The product ID identifies a class ofproduct, while the serial number identifies a particular instance ofthat class, i.e. an individual product item. The product ID in turntypically consists of a manufacturer number and a product class number.The best-known product ID is the EAN.UCC Universal Product Code (UPC)and its variants. The Item ID class diagram is shown in FIG. 50.

Currency notes are identified by a note ID. The note ID comprises notedata and a serial number. The note data identifies the type of currency,the country of issue, the note denomination, the note side (front orback) and other currency-specific information. There are two note IDsfor each physical bank note—one for each side of the printed note. TheNote ID class diagram is shown in FIG. 51.

Pharmaceuticals are identified by a pharmaceutical ID. Typically thepharmaceutical ID will be an EPC. A pharmaceutical ID consists of aproduct ID and a serial number. The product ID in turn typicallyconsists of a manufacturer number and a product class number. The bestknown product ID for pharmaceutical products is the National Drug Code(NDC), allocated and administered by the US Food and DrugAdministration. The Pharmaceutical ID class diagram is shown in FIG. 52.

Object Description, ownership and aggregation class diagram is shown inFIG. 53. This is described in more detail above.

The Object Scanning History class diagram is shown in FIG. 54. An objecthas an object scanning history, recording each time the scanner scans anobject. Each object scanned event comprises the scanner ID, the date andtime of the scan, and the object status at the time of the scan, and thelocation of the scanner at the time the object was scanned. The objectstatus may be valid, stolen, counterfeit suspected, etc. If known, theobject owner details may also be recorded.

A scanner has a unique scanner ID, a network address, owner informationand a status (e.g. on-line, off-line). A scanner is either a mobilescanner, whose location may vary, or a fixed scanner, whose location isknown and constant. A scanner has a current location, comprising thelocation details and a timestamp. A scanner may be a netpage pen, inwhich case it will be associated with a netpage Pen record. If a scannerin off-line, it will keep an object scanning history, and willoptionally store a public key list, a valid ID range list and an objectID hotlist. The scanner class diagram is shown in FIG. 55.

The manufacturer, or other central authority, maintains a number ofObject ID Hot Lists, each with a unique list ID, and the time the listwas last updated. Each hot list comprises a list of suspect object IDs,comprising the object ID, date, time, status (suspected counterfeit,stolen, etc.) and other information. The Object ID Hot List classdiagram is shown in FIG. 56.

The manufacturer, or other central authority, maintains a list of validID ranges. Each valid object ID range entry in the list comprises thestart object ID and end object ID (the valid ID range) and the time theentry was updated. The Valid ID Range List class diagram is shown inFIG. 57.

The manufacturer, or other central authority, maintains a public keylist. The public key list consists of a number of entries identifyingthe public key for a range of Object IDs. Each valid object ID rangeentry comprises the update time for the entry, the start object ID forthe range, the end object ID for the range, and the public keyapplicable to each object ID in the given range. The Public Key Listclass diagram is shown in FIG. 58.

Object authentication may be performed by the manufacturer, or by athird-party trusted authenticator. A trusted authenticator has anauthenticator ID, name and details. A trusted authenticator holds a listof public-private key pairs, each associated with one or more ID ranges.This is a list of object ID ranges (identified by the start and end ID)and the corresponding public/private signature key pair. A trustedauthenticator also holds a list of secret signatures, and a list ofpublic-key signatures. Each public-key signature identifies the actualsignature and/or the padding used to generate the signature. Each secretsignature and public-key signature is associated by object ID with aunique object. The Trusted Authenticator class diagram is shown in FIG.59.

Applications

It will be appreciated that Hyperlabel tags can be used with a range ofobjects, including, for example, items of manufacture, pharmaceuticalitems, currency notes, cheques, credit or debit cards, redeemabletickets, vouchers, coupons, lottery tickets instant win tickets, oridentity cards or documents, such as a driver's licenses or passports.

The identity can include at least one of an Electronic Product Code(EPC), a National Drug Code (NDC) number, a serial number of apharmaceutical item, a currency note attribute such as a value or thelike, a cheque attribute or a card attribute such as card type, issuinginstitution, account number, issue date, expiry date or limit.

Advantages of Hyperlabel

Unlike 2D optical barcodes that are often difficult to read due to labeldamage and a direct ‘line-of-sight’ requirement needed for scanning,optically readable, but invisible, infrared Hyperlabel tags, are printedall over, or on a large section of a product label. Hyperlabel tagssupport line-of-sight omnidirectional reading. In practice, theHyperlabel reader is designed to scan the scanning field from at leasttwo substantially orthogonal directions. This helps the reader to avoidocclusions which may occur if a hand is holding an item. Hyperlabel tagsalso incorporate Reed-Solomon error correction methods to improvereliability.

A further advantage of Hyperlabels over barcodes is that they areunobtrusive to the customer as they do not use visible label space, andtag information is not restricted to only one section of a label.

Hyperlabel tags are therefore easy to locate, easy to read, and enableaccurate automatic scanning.

Hyperlabels are less promiscuous than RFID tags since they requireline-of-sight for reading. This means that it will be difficult forcustomers to have their product scanned for information without theirknowledge. Hyperlabels provide customers with the means to protect theirprivacy.

Hyperlabels as Interactive Web Pages

A distinctive and unique feature of Hyperlabel technology is thatHyperlabels provide the opportunity to design packaging labels asinteractive ‘Web pages’—and thus make it possible for a whole new rangeof product-linked customer services to be introduced by thepharmaceutical industry.

When digital pen use becomes widespread, product graphics can be addedto labels to indicate interactive areas and prompting customers to writeor click using a Netpage pen. A digital Netpage pen can identify the x-yposition on a label, and enable a link to be established between theinformation on the label, and a Web page on a server. The Netpage penconnects the customer to an Internet-based Hyperlabel Server through acompanion device such as a mobile phone or computer.

Using a Netpage pen to interact with the label, customers can be offeredadditional information on drug use, risks and advice on potentialinteractions between drugs. It could also provide an opportunity forcustomers to register for participation in new drug trials, to enterpromotions, to participate in Web chat sessions, or to receive ‘free’samples. Web pages can be customised based on customer profiles, localarea health data, or by using a range of product supply chain data suchas geographic location.

Hyperlabels therefore make it possible for the pharmaceutical industryto extend the use of product labels and packaging to increase brandstrength, and to establish closer links with customers. Thus, withHyperlabels, the customer can become an integral part of the productsupply chain, and supply chain data can be integrated with customerrelationship management (CRM) or healthcare databases to improve theoverall efficiency and level of service offered to customers.

Hyperlabel Tags Encoding Layout Data

A Hyperlabel tagged surface carries a continuous array of Hyperlabeltags. These typically encode the product item's unique identifier (e.g.EPC) and digital signature(s), as well as a two-dimensional coordinategrid.

A range of analog printing processes are used to produce labels andpackaging, including gravure, letterpress, offset, flexographic, anddigital. Some packaging is produced using multiple processes insequence. For example, package graphics may be printed on a web-fedflexographic press, while batch and expiry information is digitallyprinted onto each finished package using laser marking or inkjet.

Hyperlabel tags may be printed digitally using an add-on digitalprinter, placed either before or after the colour press. The Hyperlabeldigital add-on printer can utilise a Memjet printhead as describedearlier, or any of a range of commercially-available laser and inkjetprintheads such as from HP Indigo, Xaar, Xeikon, Agfa.dotrix, VideoJet,Mark Andy, etc. The Hyperlabel digital printer can be web-fed orsheet-fed according to the line to which it is added.

The add-on digital printer must be synchronised with the colour press toensure registration between printed graphics and Hyperlabel tags. Thiscan be achieved by conventional means, for example by generating anelectronic signal in the colour press synchronised with the printing ofan impression, and feeding that signal to the Hyperlabel printer.Alternatively, the Hyperlabel printer can optically detect printedfiducials produced by the colour press, as is sometimes used tosynchronise die cutters with a colour press.

The Hyperlabel printer can be merely approximately synchronised with thecolour press, and fine synchronisation can be achieved by measuring theactual registration achieved and recording a corresponding offset in theNetpage server database, as described elsewhere in relation topre-tagged Netpage blanks. The measurement can take place while thepackaging is still in the form of web or sheet media, or after beingfolded or applied to the product item. In the former case detection ofthe registration of the product graphics is still required, for examplevia fiducials as mentioned above. In the latter case registration of theproduct graphics is determined by virtue of the individual packagepassing along the line. This may be intrinsic in the design of the line,or may involve a photodetector to detect passage of the item. Detectionof the Hyperlabel tag pattern uses a Hyperlabel reader in both cases.

Web or sheet media can be pre-printed (or printed in-line by an upstreamdigital Hyperlabel printer) with Hyperlabel tags which encode acontinuous and large two-dimensional coordinate space and no explicititem identifiers. After passing through the colour press, each item'spackaging will have a different range of coordinates. These can bedetected as described above and recorded in the Netpage server database(and/or a product database) as being associated with the item and itsitem identifier. When a Hyperlabel tag on a particular item issubsequently read, its coordinate can be translated into an itemidentifier by querying the Netpage server (or product server).

A digital printhead can be adapted to print both product graphics andHyperlabel tags, as described earlier in relation to Memjet digitalprintheads. Other digital printheads can be similarly adapted throughthe provision for an extra, infrared, ink channel.

As an alternative to digitally printing Hyperlabel tags, Hyperlabel tagscan be printed using an analog process such as gravure, letterpress,offset or flexographic, for example on the same colour press used toprint product graphics. A colour press is adapted to print Hyperlabeltags through the provision of an extra, infrared, ink channel; i.e.through the provision of an extra plate which bears the image of theHyperlabel tags. The Hyperlabel plate can be produced by conventionalmeans, such as computer to film (CtF) or direct computer to plate (CtP).

Note that although Hyperlabel tags are ideally printed using aninvisible ink such as infrared ink, they can also be printed using avisible ink such as a coloured, black or gray ink. And althoughHyperlabel tags are ideally printed over the entire product package,they can also be printed selectively in specific areas. And althoughHyperlabel tags are ideally position-indicating, they can also beobject-indicating, as described elsewhere.

If Hyperlabel tags are printed using an analog press, then it isimpractical to provide each product item package with a unique serialnumber. However, the Hyperlabel tags can still encode the productidentifier portion of the item identifier and the usual two-dimensionalcoordinate grid. In addition, the tags must encode a unique layoutnumber which identifies the particular graphic (and interactive) layoutof the package. The Hyperlabel tags also encode a flag which allows anyHyperlabel reader to determine that the tags encode a layout numberrather than a serial number. The layout number only needs to be uniquefor different layouts associated with the same product identifier. Itforms a unique layout identifier when paired with a product identifier,as shown in FIG. 61. The layout number changes precisely when new platesare produced for a new graphic package design, such as for a particularpromotion or a particular geographic region. CtP makes frequent layoutchanges particularly convenient.

Analog-printed Hyperlabel tags can thus encode a layout identifierrather than an item identifier, as shown in FIG. 62. During a subsequentinteraction with a product item via a Hyperlabel reader, the layoutidentifier is used to retrieve the corresponding layout to allow theinteraction to be interpreted in the usual way. For convenience we referto such Hyperlabel tags as “layout-indicating” (to distinguish then fromitem-indicating Hyperlabel tags), and the data sent from the Hyperlabelreader to the Netpage server as “layout data”.

It is convenient to encode a product identifier in the layoutidentifier, since it allows a Hyperlabel reader to identify the product.However, it is also possible to encode a pure layout identifier inHyperlabel tags which identifies the layout but does not directlyidentify the product. Equivalently, it is possible to encode a purecoordinate grid in the Hyperlabel tags and use the range of thecoordinates to identify the correspondingt layout. Thus all productitems sharing the same graphic package layout would share the samecoordinate grid range, and a change in layout would result in a changein coordinate grid range. The equivalence of a pure coordinate grid anda coordinate grid coupled with an item or layout identifier is discussedin the cross-referenced applications.

Layout-indicating Hyperlabel tags can confer interactivity in the usualway via the layout identifier and the coordinate grid that they encode,and product identification (but not product item identification) via theproduct identifier they encode.

Identification of individual product items is still important. Itconfers the various supply chain benefits discussed at length elsewhere,and plays a role in various interactive scenarios. For example, someproduct promotions may ideally be single-use, such as entering acompetition or redeeming a token.

In addition, item-level identification, coupled with a digital signatureunique to the item, allows product item authentication. In the followingdiscussion, item-indicating Hyperlabel tags typically carry the digitalsignature(s) of the item in the usual way.

Location-Indicating Tags in Conjunction with Alternative ItemIdentifiers

Item-level identification can be provided in a variety of ways inconjunction with location-indicating or layout-indicating Hyperlabeltags. For example, location- or layout-indicating tags can be printedover the whole package, while item-indicating tags can be printed inonly a small area. This has the benefit that the corresponding digitalHyperlabel printer can be relatively small, since it is no longerrequired to print tags across the full width of a web or sheet, but onlyonto a small area of each package. Digital printers for printing batchand expiry information, as well as for printing item-level indicia suchas two-dimensional barcodes, are already part of conventional packagingworkflows. A small-area digital Hyperlabel printer is can beincorporated in a similar place in such packaging workflows.

Item-level identification may be provided using a conventionalradio-frequency identification (RFID) tag 210 or a linear ortwo-dimensional barcode 211 (FIGS. 67 and 68). Even if such carriers arepresent on a package, it can be convenient to also provideitem-indicating Hyperlabel tags 4 in a small area, since these arereadable by a standard Hyperlabel reader. Any Hyperlabel hyperlink whichrequires item-level identification, such as competition entry, tokenredemption or item authentication, can be implemented in theitem-indicating Hyperlabel area. Alternatively, the user can be promptedto click in the item-indicating Hyperlabel area to identify the item,after invoking a single-use hyperlink elsewhere on the product whereonly layout-indicating tags are present.

If the item-level identification carrier is an RFID tag 210, then theHyperlabel reader 101 can incorporate an RFID tag reader to allow it toobtain the item identifier from the RFID tag 210 at the same time as itreads location- or layout-indicating Hyperlabel tags 4. Having read thedata contained in the Hyperlabel tag(s) 4 and the RFID tag 210, theHyperlabel reader sends “indicating data”, which identifies the item IDand the position of the reader, to the Netpage server. In the case thatthe Hyperlabel tags 4 are location-indicating tags, the Netpage servercan identify the layout from the item ID contained in the indicatingdata. Thus a Hyperlabel hyperlink requiring item-level identificationcan be implemented via a combination of location- or layout-indicatingHyperlabel tags 4 and an RFID tag 210. Accordingly, the Hyperlabelreader 101 may comprises an optical sensor for sensing the Hyperlabeltags 4, an RFID transceiver for sensing the RFID tag, a processor forgenerating the indicating data and means for communicating with theNetpage server (e.g. by wireless or wired communication)

Equivalently, a device already enabled with an RFID reader to providegross interactivity with an RFID-tagged object or surface can beaugmented with a Hyperlabel reader to allow it to support much morefine-grained interactivity with an RFID- and Hyperlabel-tagged object orsurface.

If the item-level identification carrier is a visible barcode 211, theninvisible item-indicating Hyperlabel tags 4 can be provided in the samearea as the barcode. This allows a user of a Hyperlabel reader 101 toclick on the barcode to obtain the item identifier, even though theHyperlabel reader 101 may be unable to read the (arbitrarily large)visible barcode. Alternatively or additionally, item-indicating tags canbe printed adjacent to the barcode using the same visible ink as thebarcode, to eliminate the need for a separate Hyperlabel ink channel. AHyperlabel reader 101 can also be augmented to allow it to readconventional barcodes.

An RFID tag or barcode can encode the same item identifier and digitalsignature(s) as an item-indicating Hyperlabel tag.

Rather than encoding an item identifier explicitly in an RFID tag 210,barcode 211 or Hyperlabel tag 4, a random pattern can be printed andcharacterised to serve both as an item identifier and as a digitalsignature. The random pattern, or at least a portion thereof, serves asa “fingerprint” for the object.

In US Patent Application Number 20050045055 (“Security Printing Method”filed 28 Aug. 2003), the contents of which is incorporated herein byreference, Gelbart discusses the addition of powder taggants duringprinting for the purpose of subsequent authentication. As discussedelsewhere, both the presence of such a taggant and the exact randompattern formed by the taggant can be used as the basis forauthentication and possibly identification.

When the random pattern formed by the taggant is used as the basis forauthentication, the pattern is measured and recorded during productmanufacture or packaging, and is measured and verified, with referenceto the earlier recording, during subsequent authentication. The randompattern may cover the entire product surface or a subset thereof. Therecorded reference data (reference fingerprints) derived from thepattern may cover the entire pattern or a subset thereof. Theverification data (or fingerprint data) derived from the pattern duringauthentication typically relates to only a small area (e.g. onefingerprint) of the pattern. It is therefore necessary to know whicharea of the pattern is being verified, so that the verification data canbe compared with the correct subset of the reference data. In somesystems this relies on detecting other surface features, such as text orline art, and using such features as fiducials. Since such features aretypically not unique, this approach may require guidance from a humanoperator.

Hyperlabel tags 4, since they encode a two-dimensional coordinate grid,provide a unique set of fiducials against which both reference data andverification data can be registered. This increases the reliability ofauthentication, and eliminates the need for human guidance. The taggantmay be mixed with either the infrared ink used to print the Hyperlabels,or it may be mixed with the colored inks used to print graphical userinformation. In FIG. 69, the ink used to print the word ‘TEA’ contains arandomly dispersed taggant. Alternatively, if the taggant is applied bymixing it with an infrared ink, then the high density and (typical) fullcoverage of the Hyperlabel tag pattern 4 ensures that the taggant isalso densely present on the entire tagged surface.

Although the random pattern formed by the taggant can be measured acrossthe entire tagged surface, at a minimum it can be measured within adefined region. This region can be graphically delineated to indicate toa user that this is where item-level identification and/orauthentication is available.

The random pattern can be characterised for each product package as itpasses through the packaging line, either while the packaging is stillon the web or sheet, or after the individual package is folded orfilled. At this stage the spatial nature of the random pattern isanalysed and recorded, either as a set of spatial features or as a hashof such spatial features. For example, each detected feature in therandom pattern can be assigned a quantised two-dimensional coordinatewithin the Hyperlabel coordinate system, and the set of quantisedcoordinates can be hashed to produce a single compact number.Verification then consists of generating the equivalent hash andcomparing it with the reference hash.

A Hyperlabel reader 101 may incorporate a reader for reading the randompattern formed by the taggant. If the taggant is read optically, thenthe Hyperlabel reader's image sensor can be used to read the taggantpattern. If the taggant uses a different wavelength to the Hyperlabeltag pattern, then the Hyperlabel reader 101 can alternate betweenactivating LEDs matched to the wavelength of the Hyperlabel tag pattern,and LEDs matched to the wavelength of the taggant. If the taggant needsto be imaged with a greater magnification than the Hyperlabel tagpattern, then the Hyperlabel reader can either always image at thegreater magnification, and subsample when processing Hyperlabel tagimages, or it can incorporate dual optical paths, optionally using abeam splitter to allow a single external aperture.

If no explicit item-level identifier is available (e.g. from an RFID tag210, barcode 211 or Hyperlabel tag 4), then the reference data (e.g.hash) can also serve as an item identifier. The product item is assigneda standard item identifier at time of manufacture, the standard itemidentifier is stored in the product database keyed by the referencedata, and the standard item identifier can subsequently be recoveredusing the verification data (e.g. hash) as a key to look up thedatabase, either for identification or verification purposes.

In the presence of layout-indicating Hyperlabel tags which encode aproduct identifier, the random pattern only needs to map to a serialnumber, not an entire item identifier.

A serialised product item carries a unique item identifier whichtypically consists of a product identifier and a serial number. The itemID may be carried by the product item in a number of ways. For example,it may be carried in a linear or two-dimensional barcode 211, a RFID tag210, or a Hyperlabel tag pattern 4. The product item may also carry adigital signature associated with the item ID which allows a reader toverify with a certain degree of certainty that the item is authentic.

Verification of Product Authenticity

We wish to allow people who purchase and use a product item to verifyits authenticity. They may use a dedicated device to read and verify theitem ID and digital signature carried by an item, or they may use a moregeneral-purpose device such as a mobile phone, suitably-enabled with areader. The reader is matched to the carrier(s) used by the product itemto carry the item ID and digital signature. For example, it may be anoptical reader for linear or two-dimensional barcodes, an RF reader forRFID tags, or an optical reader for Hyperlabel tags.

FIG. 63 shows the basic interaction between a product item, readerdevice and product service during product authentication. The readerreads the item ID and at least a partial digital signature from theitem. The reader then queries a name service using item ID to identify aproduct service for the item. The product service is typically run by oron behalf of the manufacturer of the item, and records information aboutproduct items such as product descriptions, digital signatures and/orkeys used to generate digital signatures, and pedigree information. Thereader queries the product service using the item ID and (partial)digital signature to authenticate the product item. As describedearlier, the product service authenticates the (partial) digitalsignature with respect to the item ID, and responds to the reader withan authentication result message which indicates whether the item isauthentic or not. The authentication result message may also identifythe object identity. For further security, the reader may additionallygenerate a nonce which it sends to the product service and theauthentication result message may include this nonce.

Note that the product service may in fact be composed of a number ofservices run by a number of different entities. For example, themanufacturer may run a basic product service which provides productdescriptions, but may entrust the product authentication function to athird-party authenticator.

The reader incorporates a mechanism for indicating the result of theauthentication to the user. For example, the indicating mechanism canproduce audible, visible or tactile output. In the limit case theindicating mechanism may simply provide a binary pass or failindication, such as via a beep or buzz, a green or red LED, or a shortor long vibration.

Note that the reader device may consist of a collection of devices. Forexample, the reader itself may be separate from the device used tocommunicate with services on the network, which may itself be separatefrom the device which incorporates the indicating mechanism.

However, a counterfeiter could foil a binary pass/fail indicator bytagging a counterfeit product item with a valid item ID and digitalsignature harvested from a different product class and possiblymanufacturer. To prevent this exploit, the reader must confirm themanufacturer and/or product class of the item to the user to allow theuser to correlate this information with the actual product item.

Again, the indicating mechanism can produce audible or visible output,but structured to convey the manufacturer and/or product class of theproduct item to the user. For example, the indicating mechanism can playback a spoken or synthesised audio message via a speaker, or show textand/or imagery on a display.

However, a counterfeiter could foil this system by tagging a counterfeitproduct item with a valid item ID and digital signature administered bythe counterfeiter, and spoofing the manufacturer and/or product class ofthe item to mislead the user into believing the item is authentic. Toprevent this exploit, the counterfeiter must be prevented from spoofingthe name of the manufacturer and/or the name of a product class.

FIG. 64 shows a more secure interaction between a product item, readerdevice and product service during product authentication, enhanced toinvolve a trusted certificate authority (CA). In the enhanced protocolthe authentication result message from the product service to the readeris signed by the product service. The reader can verify the authenticityof the names of the manufacturer and product class as follows. Theauthentication result message contains the manufacturer identifier. Thereader identifies a CA for the manufacturer, and queries the CA usingthe manufacturer ID to obtain the manufacturer's certificate. Thecertificate contains a public key which the reader can use toauthenticate the message, and the name of the manufacturer suitable forplayback or display. The certificate is signed by the CA, and the CAguarantees not to sign a certificate containing a particularmanufacturer name unless it has independently verified the identity ofthe manufacturer. This prevents a counterfeiter spoofing a manufacturername. The reader uses the public key to authenticate the authenticationresult message. The authentication result message includes the name ofthe product class. This prevents a counterfeiter from spoofing a productclass name. The reader plays back or displays the name of themanufacturer and the name of the product class to the user.

As an alternative to the reader obtaining the manufacturer's certificatefrom the CA, it can obtain the certificate from some other source (suchas the product service), and merely authenticate the certificate usingthe corresponding CA's signature public key.

The product service ID and manufacturer ID are one and the same, thenthe reader doesn't need to authenticate the result message. However, itstill needs to derive the manufacturer name from the manufacturer'scertificate.

Note that a single CA is backed by a hierarchy of trust, and a CA canitself be authenticated with respect to a parent CA in the hierarchy,and so on back to the root CA. The reader typically caches theauthenticated certificates of recently-encountered manufacturers andtheir CAs.

As described earlier, each product item can have a record of ownershipand a history of scan events, possibly relating to aggregates (such ascartons or pallets) containing the product item. These constitute theproduct item's pedigree. In general there is a one-to-many relationshipbetween ownership records and scan event records, and changes inownership are typically triggered by particular scan events.

The authentication result message sent by the product service to thereader, and subsequently played back or displayed to the user, caninclude pedigree information to help the user ascertain the status ofthe product item. This can indicate to the user the manufacturing anddistribution path the item has followed, or simply indicate when andwhere the item was sold (as discussed further below).

If the product item has been recorded as stolen, either individually oras part of an aggregate, then the user can also be alerted when theyrequest authentication of the item. The authentication message thenindicates that the item is stolen.

FIG. 65 shows an example authentication message displayed on a mobilephone.

Most item ID carriers, including barcodes and RFID tags, are susceptibleto exact duplication. Since the inclusion of a digital signature makesit impractical for a counterfeiter to produce a counterfeit itemcarrying a novel item ID, the counterfeiter is reduced to duplicating anitem already seen. The item's pedigree can be used to detect suchduplication, although such detection may devolve to the end user.

As an example, a counterfeiter may purchase an authentic pharmaceuticalitem and duplicate its packaging a thousand times, including its item IDand digital signature carrier, to produce a thousand counterfeit itemsfilled with counterfeit and possibly ineffective or unsafe product. Anunsuspecting purchaser, when authenticating the item as discussed above,would find it authentic. The counterfeiter, rather than purchasing theoriginal product item, could alternatively harvest the item ID andsignature of an item still in distribution or on the retail shelf.

To prevent this exploit, when a user attempts to purchase an object byreading its identifier, the Netpage server looks up a transactionhistory for the object and allows the transaction to proceed only ifthere have been no previous transactions for its item ID. If there havebeen any previous transactions, an indication of these transactions (inthe form of “transaction history data”) can be sent to the user. Thetransaction history data sent to the user may indicate the time andpossibly place the item was sold. The transaction history data may alsoindicate the identity of a reader used to record any previoustransactions or a user who has recorded himself as the owner of theobject. Hence, the user can conclude that either the object issecond-hand or that the item's ID was harvested, in which case theobject is probably a counterfeit.

If the user purchases a counterfeit item through an unconventionalchannel, then they may have no expectation that its pedigree willreflect their purchase, since they may have an expectation that the itemis being re-sold or is being sold by someone who does not record sales.To protect such a user from a counterfeit, they can be given the powerto register their purchase of the item, possibly anonymously. Since onlyone user can register the purchase, all but one purchaser of aduplicated item can detect the duplication.

To prevent ‘denial-of-service’ attacks on this mechanism, wherecounterfeiters deliberately try to undermine the system by registeringproduct items on the retail shelf as purchased, purchase registrationcan be restricted to product items already recorded as sold.

Harvesting and denial-of-service can also be prevented if the digitalsignature which confers the power to register the purchase of an item isprotected (or masked) by a tamper-proof mechanism. For example, in thecase of a printed carrier such as a barcode 211 or Hyperlabel tagpattern 4, the carrier for the digital signature can be hidden under ascratch-off layer 220 or it may simply be printed on an inside surfaceof packaging containing the object. The scratch-off layer 220 or thepackaging serves as a visible indicator of tampering. The product item200 then typically carries two digital signatures: one used toauthenticate scan events in the supply chain, and the other used by theend user to authenticate the item post-purchase, and register the itemas purchased. Alternatively or additionally, the user can also use thepublic digital signature to authenticate the item, and use thetamper-proof digital signature to register the purchase.

A reader in the supply chain can use the digital signature associatedwith an item (or aggregate) to authenticate the item before generating ascan event, or can transmit the digital signature as part of the scanevent to allow the product service to authenticate the product item, asshown in FIG. 66. This prevents counterfeit scan events from beingrecorded as part of an item's pedigree, i.e. it prevents a counterfeitpedigree from being established for a counterfeit or diverted item. Inthe Figure the product service represents the distributed set of supplychain services, run by manufacturers, distributors and retailers, whichrecord and serve information about product items. As described earlier,the scan event identifies the reader (scanner), and the time andlocation of the scan.

The reader and product service can also utilise encryption and/ordigital signing in their communications to prevent counterfeit scanevents from being accepted. For example, each reader can be registeredwith the product service and have its own private key for signing scanevents, and the product service can authenticate each signed scan eventusing the reader's corresponding public key before accepting andrecording the scan event.

It will, of course, be appreciated that the present invention has beendescribed purely by way of example and that modifications of detail maybe made within the scope of the invention, which is defined by theaccompanying claims.

1. A method of identifying an object, said object comprising coded data identifying a plurality of fiducials on a surface of the object and a random pattern superimposed with the coded data, said random pattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object, wherein said method comprises the steps of: receiving, in a computer system, fingerprint data from a data reader interacting with the surface, said fingerprint data identifying at least some of the random pattern and at least one fiducial; using the at least one fiducial to identify a portion of the random pattern; and identifying in the computer system, using the identified portion of the random pattern, an object identity.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the object identity identifies a unique serial number.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein the object identity identifies an Electronic Product Code (EPC).
 4. The object of claim 1, wherein the coded data further identifies a layout of at least one interactive element associated with the surface.
 5. The method of claim 4, wherein the layout is identified by a layout number, and one layout number is associated with a plurality of objects.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the object is a consumer product item and the coded data further identifies a product class.
 7. The method of claim 6, wherein the product class is identified by a Universal Product Code (UPC).
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the coded data further identifies the object identity.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein the object identity is identified by comparing the identified portion of the random pattern with a reference fingerprint, said reference fingerprint being indexed with the object identity.
 10. A method of interacting with an object, said object comprising coded data identifying a plurality of fiducials on a surface of the object and a random pattern superimposed with the coded data, said random pattern defining at least one fingerprint for the object, wherein said method comprises the steps of: sensing at least some of the coded data; sensing at least some of the random pattern; generating fingerprint data using the sensed coded data and the sensed random pattern, said fingerprint data identifying at least some of the random pattern and at least one fiducial; and communicating the fingerprint data to a computer system.
 11. A method of recording at least one reference fingerprint for an object, said object having a unique object identity and comprising coded data identifying a plurality of fiducials on a surface of the object and a random pattern superimposed with the coded data, said method comprising the steps of: sensing and recording the coded data and the random pattern; determining at least one reference fingerprint for the object, the or each reference fingerprint comprising at least a portion of the recorded random pattern and at least one fiducial corresponding to said portion; associating the object identity with the or each reference fingerprint. 